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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, a remarkable amount of attention - mostly
negative - has been directed at Chapter 11 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Put simply, Chapter 11 gives investors of
each member state the right to directly sue the governments of the other
two member states for measures affecting their investments which
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allegedly violate any of the treaty's investment protection provisions.'
These suits take place before ad hoc private arbitration panels which have
the power to render fully enforceable money damage awards. Respected
journalists like Bill Moyers of PBS, who devoted an entire episode of his
weekly program Now to the topic,2 and Anthony DePalma of the New York
Times, have reported on some of the cases that have arisen to date, the
latter referring to these provisions as "NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret." 3
This interest and concern over Chapter 11 is broadly-based and stems from

the sensitive nature of the measures being challenged (health, safety, and
environmental regulations),4 the fact that several of these claims have
already been decided in favor of the impugning investors, and, perhaps
most notably, against the backdrop of the anti-globalization movement.
Amidst this sound and fury there is a lesser known fact: the United
States and other trading nations have cumulatively signed over two
thousand other incarnations of Chapter 11 in the form of Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs). Chapter 11 in fact is very much modeled after
BITs, most of which have come to life within the last ten years.' For most
1. That is, investments made in the country of which the complaining investor is not a
national.
2. Now: "TradingDemocracy: the Other ChapterEleven "(PBS television broadcast, Feb.
1, 2002).
3. Anthony DePalma, NAFTA 'sPowerfulLittle Secret: Obscure TribunalsSettle Disputes,

but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, § 3, at 1.
4. The concern extends to the political class, including members of the U.S. House of
Representatives, twelve of whom submitted a letter, dated October 4, 2001, to President George
W. Bush expressing their concerns oyer Chapter 11.
NAFTA's investment provisions have opened the door to a number of unexpected
legal challenges brought before international tribunals by foreign companies
seeking financial compensation from governments. Many of these challenges have
been brought on the grounds that foreign investors must be compensated when
regulation entirely within the scope of traditional government authority over the
environment, health and safety or government purchasing negatively affects their
business interests. Under the vague and overly broad language in the substantive
provisions of Chapter 11, the actions against the United States could result in
outcomes that would not be possible if the challenges were brought in domestic
courts, thereby granting to foreign investors greater rights than those that are
available to U.S. citizens.
Excerpt, quoted in Patrick G. Foy & Robert Deane, Foreign Investment Protection Under
Investment Treaties: Recent Developments under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 16 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 299,299 (2001).

5. The United States, for example, has concluded 43 such treaties; Germany, 124; the U.K,
92; Argentina 53; Chile 45; and Russia, 52. U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, Bilateral
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of their existence BITs had been rather obscure international instruments,
of interest only to government trade lawyers and scholars. The number of
cases were few. As will be shown, BIT-based litigation has exploded and
investors have begun to reap the rewards of this peculiar form of
mandatory 6 dispute resolution7 - one which necessarily, and for better or
worse, results in a fettering of governmental control over foreign
enterprises.
Latin America is likewise commanding the headlines for all the wrong
reasons: coup d'etat, economic collapse, civil war, and endless reports of
kidnappings and endemic corruption, to name a few. Most disturbing to
free traders, there is a growing unease across the region as the citizenry
recognize that economic liberalization and foreign investment have failed
on their own to raise the lot of the fledging middle class.' These
tribulations reflect a greater malaise within the social fabric of the region,
and have a common rooting with the very kind of problems that lead to
foreign investment risks and the creation of mechanisms in response to
them, including investment treaties.
As lawyers and investors become more familiar with BITs,' and as
investor-claimants meet with relative success in securing money awards,
the number of cases, especially against Latin American nations, is rising
dramatically. An official of the world's leading administrative arbitration
center for investor-state claims, the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) - a nonprofit arm of the World Bank
confirms the specter of what one respected practitioner referred to as

Investment Treaties, 1959-1999 at 18, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (Internet ed. 2000)
[hereinafter UNCTAD Report].
6. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 484 n.129 (2002) (citing
DOLZER& STEVENS, infra note 15) ("virtually all modem treaties provide for the arbitral settlement
of investment disputes," and further noting that neither of those authors mention one that does not
so provide, nor had such a treaty been found).
7. As a general rule, states tend to avoid creating binding dispute resolution mechanisms.
See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute

Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002).
8. See Juan Forero, Still Poor, LatinAmericans ProtestPushfor Open Markets,N.Y. TIMES,
July 19, 2002, at Al; see also Chris Kraul, Bolivian Marchers Protest Chile Pipeline Plan, L.A
TIMEs, July 13, 2002, at A10 ("The marchers voiced the anti-globalization complaints heard across
Latin America these days: that foreign investment, especially involving the privatization
of state-owned companies and resources, has only led to layoffs and a rise in the misery index").
9. Unless otherwise indicated, the reader can safely assume that any discussion of "BITs"
also applies to NAFTA's Chapter 11, mutatis mutandi.
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upcoming "flood" of new cases.1 0 While I am ultimately critical of the
process now in place to resolve claims, this Article is premised on the
belief that direct-access, mandatory, and binding investor-state dispute
resolution is a worthwhile and necessary undertaking. Notwithstanding the

-

dramatic rise in claims, the soundness of the BIT raison d'etre

depoliticized, neutral dispute resolution - remains. It cannot be any less
merely because of a surge in new cases.
In regions like Latin America, the process is all the more necessary
given the inadequacies in the domestic legal order that make it an
undependable means of safeguarding investments. While there are ways
of bypassing the local judiciary, they are insufficient." The region is also
notable for its rich and relatively recent history of government takings in
numerous industries," including (perhaps especially) those with high
levels of foreign ownership. Foreign investors should not and cannot
exclusively depend on their governments to espouse their grievances.' 3
But now, with the BIT genie out of the bottle, it is time for some
hindsight reflection on its implications. In particular, after briefly touching
on the mechanics of investor-state arbitration, I will assess the background
and impact of Latin American nations' sudden willingness to offer treatybased foreign investor protections in an environment where these countries
suffer from grave shortcomings in those very spheres most necessary to
their actual ability to deliver on these promises: the rule of law and
governance.

10. William D. Rogers, Speech to Inter-American Development Bank Conference (Oct. 2627, 2000); Telephone Interview with official from the ICSID, World Bank Group (June 2002); see
infra Part VI (showing data on claim filings).
11. Arbitration clauses, for example, cannot assure the foreign investor that he will be able
to locate competent and neutral arbitrators in the arbitral venue. She may likewise lack confidence
that any award rendered in her favor in a developing country (and against the state or state
enterprise) would survive a challenge in its national courts, given concerns over inadequate judicial
independence. Finally, as a matter of legal strategy, under many BITs the decision to pursue local
arbitral remedies may deprive (or at least severely complicate) an investor's ability to subsequently
pursue investor-state remedies under the treaty. See Jan Paulsson, The Extent of Independence of
Arbitration from the Law of the Situs, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 141 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1987).
12. See LOWENFELD, supra note 6, at 405 (noting that during the 1945-1970 period,
"[u]tilities, mines, and other major enterprises were subject to state-takings in Bolivia, Brazil,
Argentina, Peru and Guatemala, among other states of Latin America (but not, in this period
Mexico).").
13. Lowenfeld observes that at least in the context of investment dispute resolution before
the International Court of Justice, "states have not often been willing in the post-War period to
undertake such espousal before the court." Id. at 431.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

7

308

JOURNAL OFLaw,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW2 [2004], Art. 3
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Vol. 16, Iss.

[Vol.

16

Perhaps at the time of treaty ratification, the vaguely worded BIT
standards seemed nothing more than innocuous treaty puffery. There were
then few published arbitral decisions on those most expansive, and now
controversial, provisions that could provide an indication of where
tribunals would go in ascertaining and setting the norms, norms which go

well beyond proscribing outright expropriations. We now have such a
sense, and the manner of interpretation by arbitrators - and their
rendering of increasing numbers of actual damage awards - is making it
clear that BIT undertakings come with real and perhaps unintended
consequences. This being so, the next logical area of inquiry is whether the
systemic and procedural features of the arbitration model are adequate to
the task of judiciously resolving these disputes on a case by case basis,
while at the same time fashioning a workable jurisprudence that foreign
investors and host states can live with. I will bring the perspective of
counsel actually involved in litigating these claims on behalf of a large
Latin American country and as someone who has spent time living in the
region. Most of the commentaries to date have come from academia, and
while some have made worthy contributions to the investor-state debate,
it is clear that many of the writers fail to appreciate many aspects of the
process - something for which they are not entirely to blame, given the
cloak of secrecy under which most of these claims proceed.
This Article is divided as follows: Parts II and III briefly describe how
the investor-state arbitration mechanism operates, and why countries,
including those in Latin America, have signed on to these treaties. Part IV
offers data on foreign investment risks from the perspective of those
actually making these investments, and discusses how these precise risks
develop in societies like those in Latin America where there is a weak rule
of law. Part V describes how the weak rule of law and other governance
problems lead to investor-state claims under BITs. Lastly, Part VI looks
at the data that buttress the concerns over the dramatic rise in claims, and
critically assesses the inherent structural and procedural features of the
investor-state model from the perspectives of the overall global legal
order, and of counsel charged with defending these claims on behalf of
Latin American respondents.
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II. A PRIMER ON BITS AND THE PARTICULAR LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
DIRECT-ACCESS, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION

A. Commonality Amongst Many Treaties
Although there are now over two thousand bilateral and regional
investment treaties worldwide, 4 they are all remarkably similar in form
and substance.' 5 This uniformity owes largely to the long-standing
existence of model treaties amongst capital-exporting nations. 6 Reference
in the treaties to general international legal norms has also led to
homogenization." Additionally, as BIT and Chapter 11 cases concluded

to date have shown, while there is no formal stare decisis within the
treaties or beyond, parties and tribunal members refer to other decisions
in the same way that common lawyers and judges do. The practice
whereby many of the same arbitrators are appointed to diverse panels
applying different BITs also leads to interpretative cross-fertilization. For
purposes of this Article, I have reviewed Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and a
number of BITs, in particular those between the larger economies of Latin
America and OECD nations. The state parties to these treaties include the
United States, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia,
Venezuela, Peru, Paraguay, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Chile."

14. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002, available at http://www.unctad.org/
Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2399& (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
15. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENs, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATES 2
(1995); Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and Resolution of the Council of
the OECD on the Draft Convention, OECD Pub. No. 23081 (1967), reproducedin 7 I.L.M. 117
(1968).
16. For example, in the 1960s, there emerged a European BIT Model and ensuing treaties
between western European nations and the developing world. In 1967, the OECD Council created
a Draft Convention on alien property. On the heels of its own predecessor Friendship, Navigation,
and Commerce treaties and the European experience, the United States followed suit in the 1970s
with its own BIT Model treaty. See K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Comments on their Origin, Purposes, andGeneralTreatmentStandards,4 INT'L TAx & BUS. LAW.

105,109-10 (1986).
17. As observed in the context of the U.S. BIT signing program, inserting reference to
standards of "international law" led to a "minimiz[ation of] the risks of inconsistency and literalism
in applying the language of the actual BIT texts." Id at 125.
18. 1 have deliberately not considered BITs signed by Brazil as none are yet in force given
their failure to be ratified by the Brazilian Senate.
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B. BITs as Unique InternationalInstruments: An Overview of Special
Rights and Special Enforcement
Not all treaties are created equal. Those, for example, in the human
rights arena are largely exhortatory in nature, and establish a minimal
institutional framework to ensure the achievement of their goals.

Compliance is weak, and the agreements often descend into empty

-

symbolism. Other more intricate and sophisticated treaty arrangements like
those under the European Union and GATT/WTO agreements spell out
meticulous obligations, are heavily reliant on institutions, and command
respect from their ratifying members. Both these and other kinds of
bilateral treaties - which typically address particular issues between
nations and set up cooperative mechanisms and norms between their
governments - generally have the subscribing states (and their conduct)
as their subjects and objects.
BITs are not so restrained. They extend the domain of public
international law to relationships between the state and private parties
a radical departure from its traditional scope. More remarkably, they rely
on private parties for enforcement by way of submission of claims rather

than from any state-initiated proceedings or state-supported institutions."9
Foreign investors become actors on the international stage by reason of
treaty-based causes of action, independent of any procedural or substantive
national law. Successful prosecution of a claim leads not to state-aimed

directives requesting policy modification ex post facto, but to actual
damage awards that are enforceable under international conventions.
Lastly, the peculiarity extends to standing itself as the right to sue is
determined by an investor's status qua alien. This overt preference in favor
of aliens - an anathema to some - recognizes the particular vulnerability
of a foreign investor vis-a-vis host governments (especially governments
in capital importing, developing countries). BITs seek to compensate for
this by giving them special causes of action generally not available to
nationals. It is beyond dispute that the effect of this regime is to diminish
sovereign authority in matters over which national law otherwise grants

complete dominion. In some cases, governments may be constrained from
taking regulatory action over investor behavior even where national law
authorizes, and public clamor demands, that very result.
19. Public international law adjudication - including in respect of treaties - has
traditionally always been in the hands of sovereign states only. The obvious comparison (and
contrast) is to the world's most important package of agreements regulating foreign trade and
commerce - the GATT/WTO - where only states can initiate and plead cases under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding.
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C. Substantive Issues

1. Applicable Law
The applicable substantive law determining host state liability will
include the specific treaty investment protections, which in turn usually
incorporate a reference to general or customary principles of international
law. Depending upon whether both the respondent state and the state of the
investor have ratified the ICSID Convention, 20 the terms of the particular
treaty, and the arbitral mechanism chosen by the investor," the tribunal
may also have the authority to apply the national law of the host state.2 2 In
such cases, a finding that the measure violated national law could trigger
an award in favor of the claimant-investor. 3
2. Summary of Essential Investment Protections and
Standards of Treatment
The full details of the substantive BIT protections are beyond the scope
of this Article. In general terms, however, the contracting state parties
20. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc-archive/9.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004). The
Convention established the ICSID itself. In investor-state arbitration claims filed pursuant to the
Convention (or its AF), the Centre acts as an administering authority, but has no institutional
personality like the International Court of Justice or World Trade Organization. ICSID arbitrations
ultimately proceed much like entirely ad hoc arbitrations such as under those constituted under
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. U.N. Commission on International Trade Arbitration Rules, G.A.
Res. 31/98, U.N. Commission on International Law, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17 ch. V, sect. C, U.N.
Doc. A/31/17 (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules].
21. See infra Part V.
22. In such a case, international law may still be relevant. The first secretary-general of the
ICSID described the interplay of national and international law in claims under the ICSID as
follows:
The Tribunal will first look at the law of the host state and that law will in the first
instances be applied to the merits of the dispute. Then the result will be tested
against international law. That process will not involve the confirmation or denial
of the host State's law, but may result in not applying it where that law, or action
taken under that law, violates international law. In that sense.. ., international
law is hierarchically superior to national law under Article 42(1).
Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes, 136 RECUEIL DES CoURS
331, 392 (Hague Acad. Int'l Law 1972-II), cited in LOWENFELD, supra note 6, at 459.
23. See Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 2 ICSID Reports 346 (1994)
(showing an example of an ICSID tribunal award founded on national law).
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agree to grant foreign investors the following: 1) admission into the host
country; 2) national treatment vis-a-vis their own investors; 3) mostfavored nation treatment vis-a-vis investors of other nations not party to
the treaty; 4) "fair and equitable treatment" under international law; 5)
"full protection and security" under international law;2 4 and 6)
compensation in the event of an expropriation.25 To date, most of the
interest amongst publicists and most of the litigation have turned on the
scope of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security," 26
and the not-so-fine distinction between what is a compensable
"expropriation" under international law, rather than legitimate regulation
which, while perhaps diminishing the value of an investment, is not
deemed expropriatory.
D. ProceduralIssues: Private Enforcement of InternationalObligations
1. The Foreign Investor as Claimant and Enforcer of Treaty Obligations
Under BITs, private investors are empowered and charged with the
rights and responsibilities of enforcement. No arbitration clause or further
consent to arbitrate is required as the treaties themselves provide for this
a priori. The standard impedimenta when suing governments - sovereign
immunity and the act of state doctrine - do not apply. During this
process, the government of the foreign investor (e.g., the other state party
to the treaty) has no say or role whatsoever in the initiation or outcome of
the proceedings. The investor simply submits his notice of claim to the
competent authority of the respondent government, which then sets into
motion the process for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and the
proceedings to follow. Assuming the claimant meets the broad and
indulgent definitions of being a national of the other state (e.g., other than
24. Collectively, these two disciplines are often referred to as international "minimum
standard of treatment."
25. Most treaties also limit the right of host governments to impose performance
requirements and to dictate over the investment's senior management appointments. Most also
guarantee free rights of transfer. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES TRADE UNIT,
INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: A COMPENDIUM -

INTRODUCTION (1999),

available at http://www.sice.oas.org/cp_bits/english/bit_ inte.asp (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
26. In Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, these concepts are joined in the same provision and
sentence in article 1105. In BITs, they are often broken down into separate, discrete disciplines.
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of Trinidad and

&

Tobago for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sept. 11, 1995, Can.-Trin.
Tobago, art. II(2), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/bits/ trican_e.asp (last visited Apr. 28,
2004).
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the host state), and is an "investor,"" he may compel a sovereign nation
before an international tribunal which will determine if that nation has
violated its treaty obligations, and if so, the appropriate amount of
compensation in the form of a money award.
2. The Foreign Lawyer as Adjudicator and Lawmaker
Under most BITs and Chapter 11, investors are given the option of
choosing one of three arbitral mechanisms to submit their claims: 1) the
ICSID Convention, where both the respondent state and the claimant
investor's home state have ratified the Convention; 2) ICSID's Additional
Facility Rules (AF), where either, but not both, the claimant's home state
or respondent state have ratified the Convention; or 3) the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules. In some cases, the International Chamber of Commerce
is also an option.2" The investor makes the choice. For the purposes of the
discussion at this point, the details of these mechanisms are not important.
What is noteworthy is that they are all essentially ad hoc processes, 29
whereby the most important players - the arbitrators - are private
agents, typically practicing international lawyers, or professors of
international law. The treaty itself leaves their selection to the parties, and,
in the usual case where the arbitral tribunal is composed of three members,
the chairman of the panel will be chosen either by consent of the
disputants or the two-already selected arbitrators, or by another trusted
agent such as the Secretary-General of the ICSID or the President of the
International Court of Justice. Normally, this chairman cannot be a
national of either side.
3. The Role of the Host State's Domestic Legal Order
Historically, an alien investor was required to exhaust local remedies
before its state could espouse a claim before an international tribunal.
Local courts were first entitled to remedy the alleged wrongdoing before
recourse to an international forum was available. Under BITs, these rules
have either been eliminated or modified. Most either permit (but do not
27. Or controls an "investment." To date, threshold questions of whether claimants meet the
"investor/investment" requirement have been decided broadly in favor of claimants.
28. Maurits Lugard, Panel on Implementation, Compliance,andEffectiveness, 91 AM. Soc'Y
INr'L L. PRoc. 485, 489-90 (1997) (comments of Alejandro Escobar).
29. As noted, ICSID arbitration is essentially ad hoc, rather than institutional. See supranote
20. While the Centre performs administrative functions, and has a list of arbitrators from
subscribing parties, tribunals (other than annulment committee proceedings) may consist of entirely
nonlisted panelists, and in practice, arbitrations proceed in very much the same manner as other
"pure" ad hoc mechanisms such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
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require) recourse to local remedies before the submission of an arbitration
claim, or - as is the case with most treaties involving a Latin American
party - require that an investor choose at the outset whether to pursue
local remedies or arbitration under the treaty.30 Under this approach, once
he chooses the local courts, he is precluded from subsequently invoking

the investor-state remedy.
III. THE CASE FOR BITS AND THEIR RISE IN LATIN AMERICA
A. The Perspective of CapitalExporting Nations - Protecting Existing
Investors and Investments
Leading capital exporting nations have seen BITs as a means to protect
existing investments,3 ' and removing the government from the thorny role
of espousal (depoliticization).32 They are also seen as promoting the
fidelity of private, contractual investment agreements between investors
and host states, and even as a means of limiting undue hindrance of
market-driven commitments of capital."
For these nations, the downside-risk of the treaties - the prospect of
being sued - has traditionally been minimal (though this may change in
the wake of Chapter 11 claims against the United States and Canada).
Although bound by the same terms as their treaty partners in the third
world, they would see little to fear in the way of claims given their own
confidence in the fairness and efficacy of their governments and legal
systems. They presumably were confident (prior to Chapter 11)34 that their
own institutions would not be found to have committed acts amounting to
a violation of international law. In any event, with so little foreign
30. See Lugard, supra note 28, at 491.
31. Concern over Latin American expropriation of U.S. investments has been cited as
spurring the U.S. interest in BITs (including Chapter 11) and investor-state arbitration.Rene Lettow
Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice System in an Era of Global
Trade, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 229, 234, 244-45.
32. Gennady Pilch, The Development and Expansion ofBilateralInvestment Treaties, 86 AM.

SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 532, 534-36 (1992) (comments of Kenneth J. Vandevelde).
33. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 159, 161 (1993).
34. Canada has already been found to have violated NAFTA by two Chapter 11 panels in
claims submitted by U.S. investors. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Gov't of Can. (Nov. 13, 2000) (Partial
Award); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Gov't of Can., Award on the Merits, Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001). Spain
is another developed country that has recently lost a BIT claim. Emilio Agustin Maffezini v.
Kingdom of Spain (Case No. ARB/97/7), reproduced in 40 I.L.M. 1030 (2001).
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investment coming in from investors in developing countries, 35 the number
of even possible claimants has always been relatively low. Other than
NAFTA's Chapter 11, BITs amongst developed countries inter se are
virtually unheard of. 36
-

B. The Perspective of Capital-Importing,Investment-Host Nations
Luring (or at Least Not ScaringAway) ForeignDirectInvestment (FDI)
For the capital-importing BIT partners of the developing world, the
motivations and circumstances are more elusive and complicated. Most

commentators and economists agree with the sentiments of a recent
Organization of American States publication that "[i]nvestment
agreements do not themselves attractinvestment, but they complement the
main determinants of FDI flows."37 Brazil, for example, is one of the
largest recipients of FDI in Latin America,38 and yet has not ratified any

BITs.
Clearly, at some level, there must be the sense (or hope) that BITs
might actually serve to promote new investment. Without this, it is

inconceivable that there would be so many treaties, nearly all of which
have a developing nation as a party. As these countries began to sign BITs
in earnest in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a domino effect as
countries emulated their neighbors and strived to send their own pro-FDI
image. Guzman describes the process from the perspective of economic
theory and group dynamics - a "bidding contest"39 - noting that "[t]heir
[LDCs] willingness to sign BITs ...
was caused by the fact that BITs
introduced a mechanism through which developing countries could
35. Consider, for example, the numbers of claims under Chapter 11. While already
approaching twenty, against all NAFTA parties, none have yet been filed by any investor of the one
developing member, Mexico.
36. That is, BITs containing mandatory arbitration provisions, as opposed to their
predecessors, the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties, which did not. UNCTAD Report,
supra note 5. The report states that "[t]here are only a few (11) BITs between developed countries."
Id. Personally, outside of the Chapter 11 context I am not aware of any investor-state claims under
one of them.
37. TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 187 (Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse
Roberts eds., 2001); see also Gudgeon, supra note 16, at 111-12. "In fact, the framers of the [U.S.]
Model BIT were unaware of any proven relationship between the existence of FCN treaties or
European BITs and investment flows." Id.
38. Indeed, Brazil was the largest FDI receipient in Latin America in 2002, though it has
since been overtaken by Mexico. See Press Release, UNCTAD, Global FDI Decline Bottoms Out
in 2003 (Jan. 12, 2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?doclD=
4387&intItemID=1634&lang=1 (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
39. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCSign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 672 (1998).
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compete for investment" and that "[t]he incentive to sign a BIT comes
from the ability to get an advantage over one's rival host countries."ao

Some commentators, however, including those with direct experience
in the process, have pointed to the realpolitik relationships between
countries like the United States and their BIT counterparts in the third
world, and offer a darker picture of the process. Jose E. Alvarez, a former
member of the U.S. State Department BIT negotiating team, and now a
Columbia University law professor, describes it as follows:
For many, a BIT relationship is hardly a voluntary, uncoerced
transaction. They [U.S. BIT partners] feel that they must enter into
the arrangement, or that they would be foolish not to.... For Latin
American countries ... the BIT represents a return to the earlier
days of reliance on FDI - before they learned to fear becoming
dependent. ... But the truth is to date the U.S. model BIT has been
regarded as, generally-speaking, a "take it or leave it" proposition,
with the United States calling the shots and the BIT partner as
supplicant. . . . A BIT negotiation is not a discussion between
sovereign equals. It is more like an intensive training seminar
conducted by the United States, on U.S. terms, on what it would
take to comply with the U.S. draft. 4 1
Finally, Dolzer and Stevens note that some capital-exporting countries like
Germany and France insist on BITs as a prerequisite for their issuing
investment insurance. 2
-

C. The Perspective of Sound InternationalLegal Relations
Avoidance of Diplomatic Tensions

History amply demonstrates that in times of political turmoil,
revolution, or periods of economic reform, investments of foreigners can
be subject to discriminatory, arbitrary, vindictive, and illegal governmental
action. The U.S. experience in Iran in the late 1970s to early 1980s, and in
Cuba in the late 1950s to early 1960s, still resounds in the memory of
many Americans, and in U.S. trade and foreign policy. While some
measures like the Mexican and Venezuelan oil nationalizations of the
1920s and 1970s, respectively, affected all private investment in a
particular field, including that of nationals, the fact of foreign ownership
40. Id. at 678-79.
41. Pilch, supra note 32, at 552-53 (comments of Jose E. Alvarez).
42. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 15, at 13.
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of local production, particularly where there is a history of foreign
domination of key industries, increases the likelihood of abusive
governmental interference in a manner which violates international law. 3
In some cases, countries have not only targeted alien enterprises, but also
those of particular foreign nations - especially former colonial masters.44
Conversely, there have also been examples of state-sponsored bullying
by investment exporting countries. These have included threats of military
action, justification for armed intervention, and, undoubtedly, countless
episodes of ill-tempered backroom arm-twisting that did little to promote
transnational goodwill and diplomacy.45 With BIT-based dispute
resolution, state departments and foreign affairs offices can largely wash
their hands of these messy disputes, and leave the responsibility (and cost)
for redress directly in the hands of the aggrieved party.4 6
D. Latin America Buys into the BIT Program
1. Economic Malaise and Reform in Latin America and the
Race to Attract FDI
During the 1970s and 1980s, with much of the world suffering from
macroeconomic crises, including severe recessions, inflation, and swelling
public debt, third world countries like those in Latin America found it
difficult to secure private sources of capital. At the same time,
industrialized nations were dealing with their own recessions and deficit

43. Lugard, supra note 28, at 485 (comments of Kenneth J. Vandevelde).
44. For example, the 1958 Indonesian nationalization of Dutch firms. See Martin Domke,
Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960).
45. See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes:
The Roles of ICSID andMIGA, 1 ICSID REV. -FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 1, 1 (1986) (citing the

example of French justification for armed intervention in Mexico in 1861-1862 on the basis, in part,
of nonpayment of a nominal amount of an incomplete loan (Jeckerclaim)).
46. Indeed, as noted by former secretary general of the ICSID, Ibrahim Shihata, the removal
of diplomatic protection was akey objective ofthe ICSID Convention. See id. at 11; see also World
Bank Executive Directors' Report, 4 I.L.M. 524, ¶ 33 (1965).
When a host State consents to the submission of a dispute with an investor to the
Centre, thereby giving the investor direct access to an international jurisdiction,
the investor should not be in a position to ask his State to espouse his case and that
State should not be permitted to do so.
Id.
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problems and cut foreign aid. Investment capital in developing nations
came to be in short supply. 47
In response to this capital crunch, from the mid-1980s through the
1990s, governments (especially in high-growth potential regions like Asia
and Latin America) began to embrace the notion that open markets, free
trade, and FDI were the ultimate long-term solution to their economic and
resulting social woes. Latin America moved from policies designed to
encourage import-substitution and a heavy governmental role in
industrialization, to those which fostered exports and market economies. 48
The nations of the region aggressively pursued Free Trade Agreements and
Customs Unions, acceded to the WTO/GATT, and liberalized their foreign
investment laws. 4 9
2. Sea Change -

From Calvo to Acceptance of Special Rights for
Foreign Investors

'

No region of the world has so completely moved from a principlebased rejection of any international role in the protection of foreign
investment, to its near wholesale acceptance as reflected in the signing of
investment treaties. This rejection-as crystallized by Nineteenth Century
Argentine jurist, Carlos Calvo - insisted that foreign investors in Latin
America renounce their right to diplomatic intervention, and required them
to settle their grievances before local courts.50 Foreign investors were to
receive the same treatment as nationals, and to be subject to national,
rather than international law. They were to receive no "special rights."5
The objection to the concept of internationally adjudicating investment
disputes continued through to the completion of the ICSID Convention in
1965. The region opposed the very idea of compulsory international
arbitration, noting that Latin America had an "unfortunate history" in that
47. Lugard, supra note 28, at 486 (comments of Kenneth J. Vandevelde).
48. TOWARD FREE TRADE INTHE AMERICAS, supra note 37, at 11.
49. Insofar as attracting foreign investment, the changes had the desired effect as FDI to Latin
America and the Caribbean rose dramatically in the short ten year-period between 1990-1999, to
the point where it almost equaled that of Asia. Id. at 33-34, 186.
50. See DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 15, at 8-9 (discussing the roots of this antagonism
as evidenced in the Calvo Doctrine); see generally Shihata, supra note 45.

51. This hostility towards the notion of foreign investor claims before international tribunals
was reaffirmed on a regional basis in 1964 by Latin American opposition to the creation of the
ICSID Convention. Shihata, supra note 45, at 12. Likewise in 1970 by the Andean Common
Market - consisting of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru - in Decision 24 of the
Andean Commission. Decision 24 of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, Dec. 31, 1970,
reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1065 (1971) (reaffirming that foreign investors were not entitled to special
treatment); DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 15, at 9.
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forum, and also complaining that it reflected an "unacceptable lack of
confidence in the integrity and independence of the national courts."" The
outlook of Rogers, as late as 1978, was decidedly pessimistic:
There is no present likelihood . .. that Latin American nations can
be brought to agree upon a general investment dispute mechanism.
In fact, the current probabilities are strongly in the opposite
direction. Latin America in recent years has bent its efforts to
convert the Calvo doctrine into positive international law, binding
on all states."
The economic circumstances and reforms of the time (as described
earlier) eventually marked the demise of Calvo principles, at least in
relation to foreign investment dispute resolution. In their own bid to attract
FDI, Latin American countries began to accept the notion of extra-national
adjudication. This included consenting to arbitration regimes contained in
investment guarantee agreements as part of the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) political risk insurance arrangements, and even to the
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of foreign states."
BIT signing on a massive scale soon followed, and most of the region
ratified the ICSID Convention." Today, virtually every country in Latin
America (including Cuba) has signed at least one BIT. These amount to
hundreds of treaties, both with fellow developing and with OECD nations.
The first BIT signed between the United States and a major Latin
American country was with Argentina in November 1991. That treaty's
symbolic significance was described at the time as "quite important ...
[as] the first ever unqualified right to investor-state arbitration agreed to
by a Latin American country in the BIT context .. . [and as] overcom[ing]
the legacy of the Calvo doctrine." 6

52. Paul C. Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention andLatin America, I 1 VA.

J. INT'L

L. 256, 258 (1971).
53. William D. Rogers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on
Investment Disputes in the Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1978).

54. Szasz, supra note 52, at 264; Shihata, supra note 45, at 24.
55. As of November 3, 2003, only Brazil and Mexico have not ratified it - the latter
nonetheless having committed to investor-state arbitration by the signing of many BITs whose
proceedings occur under one of the other mechanisms. See List of Contracting States and Other
Signatories of the Convention, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-statesen.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
56. Pilch, supra note 32, at 543-44 (comments of Kenneth R. Propp).
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IV. INVESTMENT RISK AND THE RULE OF LAW

A. Generally

-

1. Foreign Investment Considerations and Risk Factors
Recent Survey Data

Foreign investors bear in mind many factors when deciding to commit
capital abroad. These include the cost of and accessibility to trained labor,
natural resources, capital, and property; proximity and access to markets;
external and internal trade policies; taxation; foreign investment laws;
political stability; and transparency, efficiency, and stability in the legal
order. In 2002, the MIGA of the World Bank Group published an
extensive Foreign Direct Investment Survey of transnational companies
across the world" Included within the 191 companies58 taking part in the
survey were 13 of the world's largest 100 transnational businesses.5 9
Interest in investing in developing countries was high as reflected by those
countries filling more than half the ranks of the top 20 planned investment
destinations. Of these 20, at the time of the report's publication, 2 of the
top 5, and 4 overall, were Latin American countries. 60
It is noteworthy that closely after market access, companies rated the
"stable social and political environment" and "ease of doing business" as
the two next most important factors influencing site selection. 1 Of the
remaining items cited on this list of "very influential" factors, the "level
of corruption" and "crime and safety" also rank highly, in the seventh and
ninth spots respectively. 62 Both of these outrank, for example, concerns

57. The World Bank Group/MIGA, Foreign Direct Investment Survey (Jan. 2002)
[hereinafter MIGA Survey].

58. These companies are headquartered all over the world. By way of a few examples: 67
were in the United States; 12 in Canada; 5 in Mexico; 23 in Japan; 4 in Australia; 15 in the United
Kingdom; 3 in Malaysia; 11 in Germany; 4 in Brazil; and 2 in South Africa. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 3. In total, the respondents employed some four million people worldwide, with
total annual sales in the year 2000 of some $1.97 trillion USD. Over eighty percent of participants
had over US $1 billion USD in annual sales. See id. Executive Summary.
60. MIGA Survey, supra note 57, at 21. Brazil ranked 3rd, Mexico 5th, Chile 16th, and
Argentina 19th.
61. "Market access" was ranked in the top five factors by 77% of respondents, "stable social
and political environment" by 64%, and "ease of doing business" by 54%. Id. at 19.
62. To wit: "level of corruption" is cited as a very influential factor by 36% of respondents,
and "crime and safety" by 33%. Id. at 19.
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over national or local taxes.6 3 Interestingly, later in the Report's further
breakdown of "Other Business Conditions," the "existence of a bilateral
investment treaty" is specifically indicated by ten percent of
manufacturing companies, and sixteen percent of service companies, as
being a "very influential" factor influencing overseas site selection.64
As for "Greatest Perceived Risks in Foreign Direct Investment," the

indicated percentage of respondents answered that they were "very
concerned" 65 with the following (no other risks were noted):
Physical security of staff:

55%

War and civil disturbance:

50+%

Currency Inconvertibility:

50%

Breach of Contract:

40+%

Government Refusal or Inability to Enforce Laws:

40+%

Expropriation or nationalization:

40%"

2. Investment, Economic Activity, and their Relationship to
Stability in the Political-Legal Order (Rule of Law)
a. Costs to Business and Economic Development
To varying degrees, each of these risk and site selection factors are
functions of the relative health ofa country's socioeconomic development,
and legal and political institutions. Some, like currency inconvertibility,
crime, corruption, war, and civil disturbance will directly cause losses
unrelated to the operation of the business (and therefore beyond the
business's control), while others, like contractual breaches, failure to
enforce laws, and expropriation may well embroil firms in costly and time
consuming legal disputes. As costly and time consuming as they may be
in the relatively effective legal systems of the industrialized world, they

63. National taxes rank 11th at 29%, and local taxes 17th at 24%. Id at 19.
64. Id at VIII, app. 2, tbl. 2.12.
65. The survey breaks down the responses by sector: manufacturing and services. As the
responses were comparable as between the two, and for ease of reference I have averaged them.
MIGA Survey, supranote 57, at 27.
66. Id. at 27, fig. 35.
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can be positively crippling in legal systems that are undeveloped,
inefficient, and burdened with corruption.
Besides the costs to the individual businesses occasioned by these
rules, the greater damage to overall economic development is
unquestionable. In respect to the cost posed by weak judicial systems in
particular, most experts on the subject cite figures in the range of a fifteen
percent reduction in economic development. 67 In his fascinating book on
why capitalism fails to flourish in the third world, The Mystery of Capital,
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto attributes the economic misery to
"legal failure," in particular the failure to have an efficient, functioning
system of property rights that allows the formation and exploitation of
credit and capital (except for the tiny fraction of the countries' most
wealthy). 68 Former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo put it even more
simply and poignantly a few years ago when he asserted before an
audience of Mexico's banking elite that "we don't have conditions for
security; we don't have the rule of law that is required for Mexico to
develop." 69
b. The Essence of a Stable Legal Order (Rule of Law)
By "stable legal order,"7 I refer both to the operation of the legal
system as such, and more generally to the overall condition of legal and
natural persons vis-a-vis the rule of law (personal security, public order,
and enforcement of laws). 7 ' The two clearly are complementary, with the
67. See Robert M. Sherwood et al., Judicial Systems and Economic Performance, 34

Q. REV.

ECON. & FIN. 101, 113 (1994), cited in Maria Dakolias, Court Performance Around the World: A
Comparative Perspective, 2 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 87,87 n.2. This figure comports with data
from other studies. See Robert Sherwood, Judicial Systems and National Economic Performance,
in JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 31, 32 (Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando

Carrillo eds., 1998).
68. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000).
69. President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, Address at the 60th Mexican National Banking
Convention (Mar. 7, 1997), quoted in Alicia Ely Yamin & Maria PilarNoriega Garcia, The Absence
of Rule ofLaw in Mexico: Diagnosis and Implications for a Mexican Transition to Democracy, 21
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467, 467 (1999).
70. WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY

INLATIN AMERICA

2 (2000) (using "stable legal order" term in work).
71. The former general counsel of the World Bank, and secretary-general of the ICSID,
defined rule of law as:
a system of law [which] assumes that: a) there is a set of rules which are known
in advance, b) such rules are actually in force, c) mechanisms exist to ensure the
proper application of the rules and to allow for departure from them as needed
according to established procedures, d) conflicts in the application of rules can be
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health of each affecting that of the other. A sound legal system will have
the hallmarks of transparency, efficacy, accessibility, and equality.
Transparency will come from readily comprehensible laws (and the
absence of excessive, overlapping laws). It will have fair, effective, and
efficient procedures, and well-trained, motivated, and honest legal officers
including police, judges, and lawyers. It will protect personal freedoms
and property rights, including respect for contractual obligations.
Decisions from the judiciary will be as predictable as humanly possible,
will be made bearing in mind real-life economic and other implications,
and will be issued in a timely manner. 2
B. Latin America and Its Sorry Legal Order
For reasons that I explore in further detail below, nations that are
deficient in their legal order generate the very risks of concern to
transnational investors. This in turn disproportionately exposes them to
BIT-based claims as most of these risk factors are directly or indirectly
subject to scrutiny in an investor-state action. Due to the operation of their
court systems, the general rule of law situation, and related shortcomings
in governance, Latin American nations are among the most susceptible.
1. Lack of Enforcement and the Culture of Impunity (Impunidad)

-

First and foremost, rule of law requires the actual (and equitable)
enforcement of those laws already on the books. There is no greater hue
and cry in Latin American civil society than that against la impunidad
the pervasive "flagrant disregard of law."" There is no shortage of hard
law as such in these countries. Kidnapping and bribery are as illegal in
Colombia and Mexico as they are in Denmark and Switzerland. But due
to the confluence of diverse and seemingly intractable social and economic
factors, governments in Latin America are unable or unwilling to enforce
their laws to achieve the degree of compliance necessary to maintaining
a healthy legal order. As put by the Rector of the Universidad de los Andes
in Bogota, Rudolf Hommes: "Governments that actually enforce their laws
are not to be found in any country in Latin America. In some countries,
resolved through binding decisions of an independent judicial or arbitral body, and
e) there are known procedures for amending the rules when they no longer serve
their purpose.
IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD, VOL. 1, 85 (1991).
72. Dakolias, supra note 67, at 87-88.
73. DE SOTO, supra note 68, at 209.
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laws cannot be enforced because the army does not allow it; . .. [in others]
bureaucratic or political elites place themselves above the law based on the
hegemony of dominant parties." 74
2. The Operation of the Judiciary and the Bar
One of the causes of impunidad and related problems lies in the
appalling operation of the judiciary. As hardly needs be stated, a well-run
judiciary is essential to the maintenance of the rule of law. For the
investor, it becomes the most important component in his ability to seek
redress once disputes arise, as they inevitably do. For "[it] is the judiciary
that resolves business disputes, enforces the laws as written, protects
property rights, and assures the sanctity of contract - matters of key
importance for all investors, both national and foreign."" By all accounts,
most judiciaries in Latin America are failing miserably, leaving the
citizenry with little or no confidence in their court systems. 76
The nature of the failings are many and profound. These include
inordinate delay," "chronic inefficiency," 78 and corruption in all its
forms, 79 including bribery, political pressure, and personal influence. 80
Judges suffer from limited training, and engage in the "widespread use of
exparte communications."'" Ethical standards and disciplinary measures
are often nonexistent or ignored.82 A lack of transparency leads to "a legal
morass that complicates court proceedings ... [lending to the] random and
arbitrary nature of court decisions."" These personal and operational

74. Rudolf Hommes, Institutional Reliability and Development, in JUSTICE DELAYED:
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 67, at 51.
75. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Direct Foreign Investment and the Law in Developing Countries,
15 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 382, 396 (Fall 2000).

76. See Yamin & Garcia, supra note 69; Dakolias, supra note 67, at 92; PRILLAMAN, supra
note 70, at 172.
77. See Maria Dakolias, A Strategy ofJudicialReform: The Experience in Latin America, 36

VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 170-71 (1995) (noting that "[c]ases commonly take up to twelve years to be
resolved in court."); see also Edgardo Buscaglia, Obstacles to JudicialReform in Latin America,

in JUSTICE

DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA,

supra note 67, at 16-18.

78. PRILLAMAN, supra note 70, at 22.

&

79. After such a depressing account, consider the comic tale of the Venezuelan judge "found
with money in her panties after demanding payment from a lawyer," noted in Maria Dakolias
Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial Reform, 18

WIS. INT'L L.J. 353, 370 (2000).
80. Buscaglia, supra note 77, at 23.
81. Id. at 19; Dakolias, supra note 77, at 199.
82. Dakolias, supra note 77, at 184-85.
83. Hommes, supra note 74, at 48.
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deficiencies - combined with the Aristotelian logic of their civil law
traditions - can lead to decisions that slavishly adhere to the rigors of

blind formalism, at the expense of real justice.
Lawyers are also part of the problem. Experts in the area note failings
and dramatic inconsistencies in the quality of legal education, a lack of
entrance and graduation requirements; inadequate curricula and practical
training, and the lack of scholarship by professors." Generally, the only
requirement to practice law in Latin America is a law degree, and there is
a woeful lack of enforcement of ethical standards," to the extent that they
even exist. Lawyers do not see their role as that of promoting and

contributing to the rule of law, but as defending the status quo."
3. The Absence of the Rule of Law Culture
The underlying social pathologies behind these ills are beyond the
scope of this Article. Their effects, however, can be stated more simply.
Beyond a profound distrust in legal institutions, there is no belief or
appreciation in the power and importance of law as a progressive force
necessary for a sound social order and good government. Worst of all, at
all levels of society, there is entrenched the sense that obedience to the law
is not only unnecessary, but personally disadvantageous (e.g., when
seemingly everyone around you - especially those in power - are
flouting it)." This bodes poorly for any hope of change in the foreseeable
future. As stated by an administrator of the U.S. Agency for International

Development, "[w]ithout a culture that respects and expects the rule of
law, the system will remain weak.""
With no confidence in the laws, institutions, and personnel responsible
for the operation of a legal system, citizens often do not even bother
resorting to it when they should. Crimes go unreported, and property rights
go either unenforced, or vindicated extrajudicially. In this environment, the
best, brightest, and most dedicated will likely decide to avoid the
profession entirely. While corruption and inefficiencies may exist in other
endeavors, they must be all the more intolerable for those committed to the
ideal of justice, particularly in an area like the law that is entirely reliant
on government institutions.

84.
85.
86.
87.

See Dakolias, supra note 77, at 217-19.
See id. at 224.
DE SOTO, supra note 68, at 198.
See Dakolias & Thachuk, supra note 79, at 356.

88. J. Brady Anderson, Promotingthe Rule of Law Around the World, TRIAL, Nov. 2000,

at 84.
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V. THE INTERFACE OF WEAK GOVERNANCE, WEAK JUDICIARY,
REIGN INVESTMENT, AND CLAIMS PERMITTED UNDER BITs

A. Background: Advancing Claims Brought on by
Deficient Governance
What does this all mean in the context of international investment

treaties? Put another way, how is it that weak legal systems are implicated
by BITs? Usually, the implication is not direct. As discussed below, these
treaties allow for varying degrees of ease-of-access to investor-state

arbitration based on a claimant's decision to either avoid the local courts,
or even impugn them directly as the essence of a claim.
More significant to the prospect of increasing claims is the related
problem of deficient governance. As some state action (or lack thereof) is

required for there to be a "measure" challengeable under an investment
treaty, the source of claims lay in the controversial and difficult decisions
of public officials. Moreover, foreign investment from industrialized

economies into third world regions is often developmental in nature, and
requires a close working and regulatory (and sometimes even contractual)
relationship between the investor and the host state. Experience to date
under BITs and Chapter 11 bears this out. Where foreign investors feel
that the local review mechanisms are inadequate or worse, they may try
seeking redress before international tribunals. Even those that first proceed
domestically before the local courts, but lose, may try again before the

investor-state arbitration mechanism.
B. Weak Rule of Law Permits Culture of Poor Governance
A weak legal order invariably contributes to poor governance and vice
versa. Dysfunctional legal systems fail to rein in corrupt public officials,
and fail to establish clear legal norms for regulatory bodies, and for society

at large, including the investing community. They also hinder the ability
to enforce norms (where they are in fact clear).
The same class of problems afflicting the judicial branch of
governments in Latin America is likewise present in the civil service at
large, especially those at the low to mid-upper tier level," who are charged
with making everyday decisions that regulate business. These include
deficient training and education, political influence, lack of accountability,
89. As for the upper range of the civil service, my own experience in Latin America with
officials has been positive and reflective of skilled personnel.
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nepotism, and corruption. Professionalism and dedication suffer from the
high degree of turnover occasioned by changes in the government,
especially where the new officials are from a different political party.
These failings will necessarily have a negative effect on the quality of the
decision-making process of administrative agencies. In those countries
where there is political instability (also a product of rule of law),
illegitimate and desperate governments will be more prone to rash and
imprudent decisions. Officials who are unmotivated (except perhaps by
personal gain), ill-trained, subject to undue outside pressure, or corrupt,90
are bound to make poor judgments that are not based on the letter and
spirit of the law.'
Over their lifetime, foreign investments will regularly be subject to
such regulatory and quasi-judicial decisions. These will include those
relating to: permit applications and licensing;9 2 taxation; imposition ofnew
health, safety, labor or environmental standards; fines and penalties;
banking, currency, and accounting; and all manner of resolutions by
political,judicial, and quasi-judicial bodies deciding over competing rights
and interests such as in property, contractual, or labor disputes. It is the
necessary and constant interaction between the government and the
governed that creates the prospect of conflict between host governments,
and their BIT-protected investors.
C. Advancing Claims in an Environment of Weak Rule of Law and
Governance - An Overview
At least three classes of claims arise out of this environment: 1) where
host governments act contrary to their own law to the degree that the

investor contends that the-illegality also violates a BIT protection; 2)
where the local judiciary has become involved in the dispute in some
manner, and its decisions (or the legal machinery as a whole) are directly
impugned as having wreaked a "denial ofjustice"; or 3) where the BIT and
arbitral mechanism authorize a tribunal to apply domestic law, and allow
the investor to opt for arbitration even in the absence of a claim of breach
90. Elected political officials were accused of corruption in Metalclad. Metalclad Corp. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Tribunal Decision (Aug. 30, 2000) rev 'd.
in part, United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (2001) B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 (Sup. Ct. B.C.).
However, the panel entirely ignored the issue. Infra Part VI.
91. See Buscaglia, supra note 77, at 23 (regarding Latin America in this context: "If the
awarding of public posts is not merit-based - rather, one finds a politicized bureaucracy that is
poorly paid and ill trained - corruption will inevitable result ... ").
92. The discretionary nature of permit and licensing decisions makes them particularly
susceptible to arbitrary and capricious decision-making.
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of the BIT. In a single proceeding, a claimant will allege as many of these
as the governing law and facts permit.
1. Indirectly: Tribunals Called Upon to Find Violations of
International Law for Alleged Breaches or
Liability Under National Law
To date, this is the most common class of claim generated by flawed
local decision-making. 93 Many BITs explicitly set out the applicable law
and limit the justiciability of claims to those which allege violations of the
treaty itself (including the incorporated norms of customary international
law). In principle, while national law may play a role as juridical fact, 94 it
is not a basis unto itself upon which states can be held internationally
responsible. Bin Cheng states the proposition as follows:
International law and municipal law belong to different spheres. The
rules of the one are not applicable in the other except by
incorporation or by reference. For the determination of the existence
of an unlawful act in international law, it may be said, therefore,
that municipal law, as such, is wholly irrelevant. 95
Nonetheless, claimant lawyers have not been deterred and will allege
treaty violations where the essence of the complaint turns on municipal
law, including the breaching of concessions and other agreements. 96 Acts
triggering liability under national law are characterized as also violating
the investment treaty (in the same way that a single delict can
independently amount to a violation of state and federal law), particularly
regulatory measures that deprive the investor of all or much of the benefit
of his investment. In such a case, expropriation arguments will
predominate, or, where there is no substantial deprivation, claimants will
allege that in violating its own law the host state has failed to provide full
protection and security or fair and equitable treatment.
Precisely how and when a state's liability under its own law gives rise
to a breach of these BIT protections is impossible to delineate. There is
little jurisprudence to help draw the line. Beyond mere uncertainty, this
93. See infra Part V.D. (discussing some of the cases).
94. See IAN BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 40-42 (4th ed. 1990).
95.

BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND

TRIBUNALS 172 (1987).
96. Under some BITs - a minority based on those I have reviewed - such breaches are
clearly within a tribunal'sjurisdiction as the treaty explicitly imposes an obligation to fulfill such
undertakings and makes the failure thereof a breach of the treaty itself.
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begs the question whether it is wise at all for international tribunals to be
deciding international responsibility on the basis of matters of purely local
law. Parties in an investor-state action will submit conflicting expert legal
reports on domestic law, each facially convincing. The version accepted
may then be based not on the arbitrators' real ability to discern local law,
but on which account they prefer. The standing of these claims is

particularly dubious where the investor has not sought local redress,
meaning neither party is in a position to assert that the measure in fact was
contrary to local law as determined by a municipal court. Such
determinations by national courts are generally deemed conclusive for the
purposes of subsequent international proceedings. 97
In view of Chapter 11 's first case to proceed to hearing, Azinian v.
Mexico,98 claims of this sort (e.g., where the measure in question has not
been tested domestically) could become common, as there may well be a
significant strategic disadvantage to first pursuing local remedies. In
Azinian, the claimants alleged that the nullification of a waste collection
concession by the municipality ofNaucalpan amounted to an expropriation
under NAFTA. Prior to invoking treaty arbitration, the investors
challenged the municipality's actions under domestic law before local
administrative courts. The suits were dismissed on three separate occasions
and the nullification upheld. They then turned to Chapter 11.
The arbitration claim made no complaint against the Mexican court
decisions themselves, but rather alleged that the acts of the municipality
in nullifying the concession were "confiscatory," and therefore "acts of
expropriation."9 9 This strategy of steering clear of any discussion of the
prior domestic proceedings was ultimately deemed to be "fatal to the
claim"' 0 (although the tribunal did later consider the issue ex abundante
cautela). The tribunal concluded that while under NAFTA an investor is
not faced with a fork in the road, and may first pursue local remedies, the
decision to so proceed changed the focus of any subsequent investor claim.
In a case where a local authority's actions have been validated judicially,
the examination necessarily shifts from an analysis of the action of that
authority, to the court decisions themselves:
97. See BROWNLIE, supra note 94, at 41 (citing inter alia, Serbian Loan, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) Nos. 20-21, at 46) ("Interpretation of their own laws by national courts is binding on an
international tribunal. The principle rests in part of the concept of the reserved domain of domestic
jurisdiction and in part on the practical need of avoiding contradictory versions of the law of state
from different sources").
98. Azinian v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999), 39 I.L.M. 537
(2000).
99. Id. 190.
100. Id. ¶ 100.
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97. With question thus framed, it becomes evident that for the
Claimants to prevail it is not enough that the Arbitral Tribunal
disagree with the determination of the Ayuntamiento.""1 A
governmental authority surely cannot be faulted for acting in a
manner validated by its courts unless the courts themselves are
disavowed at the internationallevel. As the Mexican courts found
that the Ayuntamiento's decision to nullify the Concession Contract
was consistent with the Mexican law governing the validity of
public service concessions, the question is whether the Mexican
court decisions themselves breached Mexico's obligations under
Chapter Eleven. 0 2
The claimants were thus required to establish a "denial of justice," as
that phrase is used in the context of international law. 0 3 In theory, this
reasoning should cause counsel for BIT-protected foreign investors to

think twice before pursuing local remedies. The effect of doing so may be
to inoculate government measures - the chief complaint behind most
claims - and place claimants in the more difficult position of proving a
denial of justice. One can readily imagine the scenario where an
outrageous measure is promulgated and challenged domestically, but no
relief granted by the local courts for any number of procedural or
substantive reasons that are perfectly sound and reasonable, and thus are
made unimpugnable in a subsequent denial ofjustice allegation before an
international tribunal. Taking the Azinian reasoning to its logical
conclusion, the measure itself giving rise to the judicial action would be
beyond challenge in any subsequent arbitration claim.
2. Denial of Justice Under International Law: Directly Impugning the
Legal Order
What is referred to broadly as denial of justice includes matters of
substance and procedure, although most publicists are confounded by its
precise scope at international law. As one practitioner-scholar noted at a
conference on denial of justice under Chapter 11, "... no one ... really

101. "Ayuntamiento" is the Spanish word denoting the municipal political entity.
102. Azinian, 39 I.L.M. ¶ 90 (emphasis in original).
103. The tribunal determined that no denial of justice had occurred, and the claim was
dismissed.
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knows what it means."1'4 Others have asserted that it is "one of the oldest
and one ofthe worst elucidated [doctrines] in international law."'0 5 As with
other ill-defined legal maxims, I suspect denial of justice will be found by
tribunals on a "you know it when you see it" basis.
Brownlie notes that "the term has been given such a variety of
definitions that it has little value and the problems could be discussed quite
adequately without it."' 06 He then sets out his preferred exposition of the
term as set out by the Harvard research draft:
Article 9. A State is responsible if an injury to an alien results from
a denial of justice. Denial of Justice exists when there is a denial,
unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross
deficiency in the administration of justice or remedial justice,
failure to provide those guarantees which are generally considered
indispensable to the proper administration ofjustice, or a manifestly
unjust judgment. An error of a national court which does not
produce a manifest injustice is not a denial of justice.'0 7
As noted, in the context of investor-state arbitration, denial of justice
was considered by Azinian. Three distinct bases for international claims

against the judiciary were set out: 1) the traditional concept of "denial of
justice"; 2) national court decisions that are clearly incompatible with
international law; and 3) under certain exceptional circumstances, national
court decisions which are contrary to national law."' Others break down
these components into procedural and substantive elements.
The more limited or procedural "denial of justice" discussed in Azinian
includes those circumstances where "the relevant courts refuse to entertain
a suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they administer justice in a
seriously inadequate way."19 Others describe these in more detail as the
failure to meet the obligation to provide access to courts, reasonable
notice, adequate time to prepare, right to produce evidence, and reasonable
speed. They may also include the requirement of access to an impartial
104. Don Wallace, Jr., Seventeenth Annual Symposium on Investment, Sovereignty, and
Justice:Arbitration UnderNAFTA ChapterEleven: State ResponsibilityforDenial ofSubstantive
and ProceduralJustice Under NAFTA ChapterEleven, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 393,

399 (2000) (comments of Don Wallace).
105. Lerner, supranote 31, at 248 (citing Charles de Visscher, Le Deni De JusticeEn Droit
International, 52 RECUEIL DE CoURS 369, 369 n.89 (1935)).
106. IAN BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 529 (3d ed. 1998).
107. Id. at 532.
108. Azinian, 39 I.L.M. 1 98.
109. Id. ¶ 102.
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tribunal and one which will not discriminate on the basis of alienage." 0
Substantive denial of justice relates to judicial decisions themselves
categories (2) and (3) under the Azinian analysis. Others describe these as
"manifestly unjust decisions," those with "gross defects," or so wrong and
unjust that the court had to be corrupt or biased."'
3. Directly: Tribunals Vested with the Power to Apply National Law
and Adjudicate on Disputes That Are Entirely Local in Nature
As noted in Part II, the scope of applicable law in an investor-state

arbitration claim will depend, in part, on the terms of the BIT. Many
explicitly or indirectly authorize tribunals to apply national law, in
addition to the treaty and international legal principles.' 2 Here, a decision
to bypass local remedies will be motivated by any number of concerns
related to the operation of the domestic legal system, as opposed to the
local substantive law itself.13 The scope of such claims may well involve
issues of fact and law that are entirely domestic, without any allegation of
a breach of the BIT or international law."' Any decision to so proceed will
110. Lerner, supra note 31, at 252.
111. Id. at 261-62.
112. ICSID Convention art. 42, Some BITs do not set out a proper law, in which case national
law will apply (in ICSID Convention proceedings) by virtue of article 42 which reads:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may
be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall
apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on
the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.
Id.

113. Unless the BIT incorporates the customary international law requiring that the alien first
pursue local remedies.
114. See Compaflia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Vivendi) Case No.
ARB 97/3, Decision on Annulment, (July 3, 2002) 41 I.L.M. 1135 (2002).
Secondly, Article 8 [of the France-Argentina BIT] deals generally with disputes
"relating to investments made under this Agreement between one Contracting
Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party." It is those disputes that may
be submitted, at the investor's option, either to national or international
adjudications. Article 8 does not use the narrower formulation, requiring that the
investor's claim allege a breach of the BIT itself. Read literally, the requirements
for arbitral jurisdiction in Article 8 do not necessitate that the Claimant allege a
breach of the BIT itself: it is sufficient that the dispute relate to an investment
made under the BIT.
Id. 155.
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have to carefully weigh the relative costs - both financial and
otherwise"' - of an international arbitration, against the perceived
efficacy and fairness benefits.
D. The Present andFuture of Claims Against Latin America
Where rules are not clear, and government decision-makers not up to
the task, it is easy to plausibly contend that a host state has not abided by
its own law. Likewise, where legal systems are dysfunctional, injustices
are inevitable, including those that may rise to the level of denial of
justice. As to the former (state violation of municipal law), their potential
scope is vastly enhanced by the textual ambiguity of investment treaties,
especially under fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security clauses. Where an investor is able to make out a case that a host
state has violated its own law, it is a small step to then assert that the state
has denied it that basic degree of protection afforded by international law.
The case law (arbitral decisions) has further compounded the ambiguity
problem in rendering a muddled body of rulings which expose these two
particular standards as the black holes of investment treaties. Until
tribunals more carefully define and demarcate their meaning,"' we can
expect claimants to plead them every time they allege that a host state is
liable under its own law.
This is not mere speculation. In Metalclad, for example, the heart of the
tribunal's award under fair and equitable treatment centered on confusion
over applicable Mexican environmental norms. The tribunal concluded
that "all relevant legal requirements for initiating, completing, and
successfully operating investments ... should be capable of being readily
known to all affected investors of another Party. There should be no room

115. See infra Part VI.B (discussing some of these).
116. It is still too early to tell the degree to which "fair and equitable" and "full protection and
security" will open the door to mass challenges against all manner of government action. See Foy
& Deane, supra note 4 (discussing some of the conflicting jurisprudence under NAFTA article
1105). In respect of both expropriation and "fair and equitable treatment," consider, for example,
the words of James Crawford, the International Law Commission's Special Rapporteur on State
Responsibility (1997-2001), who is also sitting and has sat as an arbitratoron a number of BIT and
Chapter 11 cases (".... we are still working out the content ofthe 'international minimum standard'
on a case-by-case basis - as witness current developments in the application of Articles 1105 and
1110 of the [NAFTA] and their equivalents in bilateral investment treaties. It is doubtful whether
a single generally applicable principle has emerged in that field in whose terms the decisions can
be explained").

James Crawford, The ILC's Articles on State Responsibility of States for

InternationallyWrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 874, 886 (2002).
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for doubt or uncertainty on such matters.""' The tribunal later focused on
the municipal council's denial of a construction permit, and concluded that
the council had erred under Mexican law in considering non-construction
factors."'
In Tecmed," 9 like Metalclad, a case centering on Mexican permitting
troubles for a hazardous waste landfill, the claimant primarily contended
that the failure by federal authorities to renew an operating permit was
contrary to Mexican legislation and thus in violation of the "fair and
equitable treatment" standard, in addition to being an act equivalent to
expropriation.*20 Seminal to the tribunal's conclusion on "fair and
equitable treatment" was its finding that officials of the federal Mexican
permit agency had acted "inconsistently and indecisively ... such actions
being a source of ambiguities and uncertainties which in themselves were
prejudicial to the investor in respect of the evaluation of the legal status of
its investment and the manner in which to adjust its activity in order to
both prepare in advance and preserve its rights. ... ""'1 In the pending
Waste Management case, 2 in addition to denial of justice claims
formulated at the last minute, the investor primarily alleges the failure by
the City of Acapulco to enforce its own municipal bylaws in connection
with an exclusive municipal waste collection concession. In effect, this is
an example of impunidad in that unauthorized waste collectors were not
adequately sanctioned and prosecuted for continuing to collect in the
exclusive concession area, litterers were not stopped, and even that local
residents were not fined for failing to secure the services of the
concessionaire as allegedly required under the municipal bylaw.

117. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Tribunal
Decision (Aug. 30, 2000), rev 'din part,United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (2001) B.C.L.R.
(3d) 359 (Sup. Ct. B.C.) ¶ 76.
118. Id.186.
119. T~cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2). This claim was by a Spanish investor on the basis of a Mexico-Spain BIT whose
essential terms mirror those of Chapter 11.
120. Ultimately, the tribunal's ruling on the expropriation ground was founded on a rather
novel proportionality analysis that was facially independent of national law considerations. Mexico
had strongly argued that the tribunal had no jurisdiction under the BIT to apply Mexican law, and
the panel avoided doing so. Nonetheless, a review of the overall thrust of the claim - including
the investor's expert on Mexican law - shows that its primary complaint centered on its
contentions that the resolution denying permit renewal was in violation of Mexican law. See id. ¶
95-151.
121. Id. 1 172 (translation by author).
122. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3).
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Finally, in the recently concluded Feldman arbitration, 2 3 much of the
claimant's case was centered on Mexico's alleged failure to comply with
decisions of its Supreme Court, a claim which was dismissed by the
tribunal. Ultimately, the case was decided in his favor on a fairly narrow
ground with a limited damages award.
As to denial of justice, Chapter 11 has already seen several claims
founded on these principles, against both the United States and Mexico."'
Indeed, scrutiny over national legal systems forms part of an overall trend
that goes beyond investment treaties. As noted by a World Bank researcher
in the comparative operation of national legal systems:
The global expansion of international trade and investment,
increasing regional economic integration, and spreading political
democratization have been central to this resurgence [in interest in
comparative law]. On the one hand, the increasing
internationalization of legal disputes has focused growing attention
(particularly in the business community) on comparative legal
standards - both substantive and procedural. It has also focused
attention on issues of judicial efficiency, predictability and cost
across borders. 2 5
At this stage, it is impossible to quantify the precise degree of exposure
faced by host states. It is clear, however, that claimants are seeking to
expand the kinds of circumstances that can be said to constitute a denial
of justice under international law. There is scholarship to the same effect.
For example, while the treaties only apply to state action, and not to purely
private transactions, it has been argued that the obligation to provide "full
protection and security" could implicate the actions of private parties
where the host state failed to take "reasonable steps" under its legal system
to ensure the protection standard was met.126 It has also been suggested

123. Marvin Feldman v. Mexico (Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1).
124. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States of America (Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2); Loewen
Group, Inc. v. United States of America (Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3). In Mondev, the claim was
rejected. In Loewen, the trial that the Canadian investor was subject to before Mississippi state
courts was described by the panel as a "disgrace." Id. 1 119. At the same time, the claimant failed
to fully make out his claim on the basis of the local remedies rule. Id. 1217. More generally the
rejection was due to a lack ofjurisdiction occasioned by the investor's sale of the enterprise during
the proceeding to a U.S. entity. Id. 11234-39.
125. Dakolias, supra note 67, at 90.
126. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment LiberalizationandEconomic Development: The Role
of BilateralInvestment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501 n.28 (1998).
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that the very maintenance of a corrupt legal system may in and of itself

amount to a denial of the fair and equitable treatment standard.17
The implications for any such expansion of the doctrine are obviously
great for Latin America. Indeed, it has been argued in the past that the U.S.
promotion of denial of justice claims before international tribunals is in
large part rooted in its experience of perceived injustices before Latin
American courts."' Again, recent and outstanding claims against Mexico
provide a good sense of where we may be going. Returning to Metalclad,
one of the tribunal's other findings against Mexico under article 1105
concerned that same municipal permit denial, where the panel found that
the municipality had failed to grant the investor an opportunity to appear,
be invited, or even notified of the meeting during which the application
was heard.1'29
While the tribunal did not analyze this fact in any detail under the
denial of justice principles (having grounded responsibility elsewhere),
clearly these are the very kinds of circumstances that could have engaged
the doctrine. In the pending Waste Management claim, the issue is
addressed head-on, both in respect of the substance of certain Mexican
Federal Court decisions, and on denial of access issues arising from
allegedly inconsistent legal positions taken by different Mexican entities
and subdivisions before domestic judicial and arbitral fora.

127. See David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental Protection andInvestor Rights Under

Chapter 11 ofNAFTA, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10646, 10651 (2001).
128. Lerner, supra note 31, at 247; see Rihani Claim (United States v. Mexico), Decision 27C, American Mexican Claims Report 254 (1948); Bronner v. Mexico (United States v. Mexico,
1874); 3 JOHN BASSET

MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO

WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3134 (1898) (showing examples where these led

to claims before international tribunals).
129. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Tribunal
Decision (Aug. 30, 2000), rev 'd in part, United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (2001) B.C.L.R.
(3d) 359 (Sup. Ct. B.C.) ¶ 91.
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VI. THE INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRAL MODEL: SOME REFLECTIONS ON
ITS CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH THE PROSPECT OF A "FLOOD" OF
FUTURE CLAIMS IN LIGHT OF ITS PRESENT OPERATION

A. Are We in the Middle of a "Flood"of Claims Against
Latin America?
The precise number of concluded and pending cases under investment

treaties is next to impossible to determine. Those submitted to arbitration
before the ICSID (under the Convention and the AF) are at least noted on
the Centre's web site, and many of them have been published. Those,
however, submitted pursuant to UNCITRAL or other regimes may be
entirely unknown except to the parties, their lawyers and tribunal
members.13 0 With that caveat, the ICSID listings are an acceptably
representational account of the numerical trends in case filings, and likely
a majority of the actual numbers of cases. While many NAFTA-based
claims have been submitted under UNCITRAL, including at least three
against Mexico,"' my own sense is that most BIT cases are submitted
under one of the ICSID mechanisms.
1. History and Trends
That there has been an exponential rise in the number of registered
cases is undeniable:1 3 2

130. The presumption and practical reality is that in all cases hearings are held in camera. In
one recent Chapter 11 hearing, however, between a U.S. investor and the government of Canada,
the parties and tribunal opened proceedings to the public. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Gov't
ofCan. available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/parcel-en.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2004).
Likewise, the upcoming hearing in Methanex Corp. v. United States ofAmerica will also be open
to the public. The claimant in that case is a Canadian investor.
131. GAMI Invs., Inc. v. Mexico, Apr. 9, 2003, Notice of Arbitration, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/11848.pdf(last visited Apr. 29,2004); Thunderbird
Gaming Co. v. Mexico, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c7666.htm (last visited Apr. 29,
2003); Robert J. Frank v. Mexico, available athttp://www.state.gov/s/1/c7928.htm (last visited Apr.
29, 2004).
132. See ICSID, List of Pending Cases, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
pending.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003); ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
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Years

1971-1975
1976-1980
1981-1985
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
2001-2003*

No. of Cases Registered

[Vol.

16

Avg. per Year

5
4
11
6
9
46
54*

1
<1
>2
>1
<2
>9
>21**

* data for two years, 7 months only (up to July 31, 2003)
** prorated
2. Pending Cases Against Latin America
As of today, over one-half (30 of 59) of the pending cases before the
ICSID involve Latin American countries as respondents. 33 This is the case
even though the region's biggest economy and largest recipient of FDI
(Brazil) is not a potential respondent given its refusal to ratify any BITs.
This also represents the largest number of claims against a particular
region - e.g., Canada/United States; Western Europe; Eastern Europe;
Asia; Africa; and the Middle-East. 3 4
B. Systemic and Procedural Deficiencies
So if an investor-state arbitral remedy is sound in principle, what of the
present model in practice? Are the systems and procedures in place suited
to resolve claims of this sort that oftentimes are highly contentious and
raise profound sovereignty implications, and always require a delicate
balancing of interests? Are contracting BIT parties getting their money's
worth from the ad hoc private regime that they have created and that is
charged with deciding over claims for damages that often exceed tens and
even hundreds of millions of dollars?
Writing over twenty years ago, the Honorable Justice Kerr - a
champion of arbitration in England - set out some inherent flaws of
international arbitration as a means of settling transnational disputes:

133. As of August 15, 2003. See ICSID, List of Pending Cases, supra note 132. This figure
does not include the claims against the non-Latin Caribbean countries of Guyana, and Trinidad and
Tobago.

134. Id.
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[I]nternational arbitration will always have two disadvantages over
litigation in courts .. . costs and delay, which go together.... First,
all three arbitrators .. . will require substantial fees, whereas under
our system the services of a judge cost nothing except negligible
court fees. Secondly, the members of the tribunal may have to
transplant themselves to the agreed venue; . . . involv[ing] the
parties in considerable air fares and hotel expenses on numerous
occasions. Thirdly, even if both parties co-operate, there will be
considerable delays and a cumbersome process of communication
with, and between, three arbitrators, often in three different
countries....
Moreover, if one of the parties is intent on dragging its feet, there
will be ample opportunity for doing so. It may take months before
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is settled, and even
afterwards there may be resignations and the necessity to
reconstitute. One has even heard of resignations on a prearranged
basis if one of the parties has deliberately appointed an arbitrator
who is not independent.'"
While my own experiences come two decades after these words were
written, and relate to the more particularized investor-state (as opposed to
purely commercial) arbitration, I cannot overstate the degree to which
Kerr's complaints ring true for modern BIT proceedings. For even in the
world of instant (and economical) communication represented by fax and
e-mail, the delays and costs spoken of are no less the case today. These
significant obstacles pale in comparison to some of investor-state
arbitration's other fundamental flaws. What follows are my own thoughts
on some inherent procedural and systemic flaws with how these claims are
actually adjudicated. Apart from my direct experience in a half-dozen or
so investor-state proceedings from the perspective of a Latin American
respondent,1 36 I also necessarily draw on my previous litigation experience
before Canadian courts. For it is against that backdrop - my conception
of how justice should operate - that I have formulated the observations
that follow.

135. Justice Kerr, InternationalArbitrationv. Litigation, J. Bus. L. 164, 175-76 (1980).
136. In addition to indirect knowledge and access to information of several others.
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1. Invertebrate Justice: The Perils of a Free-Floating
Adjudicative System
As remarkable as BITs are, they are relatively simple and brief, usually
six to seven pages long. They establish no institutions of any kind that are
responsible for their orderly operation.' We have already seen that their
core feature - direct access to binding investor-state arbitration - is a
largely ad hoc, private exercise that develops on a case-by-case basis. The
only role in theory for any simultaneous action by the state parties is in the
event that disputes arise on questions of the treaty's interpretation in which
case state-to-state arbitration is available. But even this is ad hoc, and
proceeds in essentially the same way as an investor-state claim. At the
conclusion of the proceeding, instead of a money award, the panel will
issue binding interpretative rulings.
a. Lack of Any Effective and Consistent Review
The lack of any effective and consistent review or appeal mechanism
is quickly emerging as the most glaring defect of investor-state arbitration.
Treaty negotiators and apologists suffer from the hubris that their threeperson tribunals will never get it so wrong that particular decisions will
need to be overturned. Arbitrators and publicists who support the process
speak of the vast wisdom and experience in international law of most
panelists, and contrast this with those who make up national judiciaries.
This is all well and good but misses the point that any adjudicative panel
can err, and that there should always be at least one review opportunity
before a fresh set of eyes and ears. The failure of such an opportunity risks
disenchanting parties on a case-by-case basis, and adds to the general
uncertainty in deciphering the scope of the treaty rights.
The treaties themselves do not contemplate any formal or regular
system of review of tribunal decisions. Most simply stipulate that the
decision of the tribunal is to be "final and binding on the parties.""'
137. Chapter 11 of NAFTA is the exception to this as under Chapter 20 of that agreement a
"Commission" is charged with safeguarding certain aspects of the treaty, including by issuing
binding interpretations on the meaning of the provisions of the investment chapter. See North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 & 605 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA]. It has no distinct personality from the state parties, however, and is
composed of a minister or secretary from each of their governments.
138. See, e.g., Acuerdo para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones entre la
Republica de Colombia y el Reino de Espaia, art. XI(4) (1995) ("Las sentencias de arbitraje serdn
definitivas y vinculantes para las partes en la controversia. Cada Parte Contratante se compremete
a ejecutar las sentencias de acuerdo con su legislaci6n nacional").
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Nonetheless, awards may require judicial enforcement (e.g., where an
investor has prevailed) under national legal systems, and also may be
subject to scrutiny by the jurisdiction designated as the place of arbitration,
at which point the losing side (investor or host state) will have some
opportunity for judicial review. Either of these scenarios will apply to
arbitrations conducted under the AF or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
Those submitted pursuant to the ICSID Convention proper have their own
internal review (annulment) and enforcement mechanisms provided by the
Convention.
(1) National Court "Review" for Arbitrations Outside the
ICSID Convention Proper
As just mentioned, the AF and UNCITRAL arbitrations are only
subject to the review available in the national courts of that country
designated by the tribunal as the place of arbitration,'" or by those same
courts in the country where the investor may seek to enforce an award
against a respondent state. As a practical matter, however, with states
committing themselves to not interfering with international arbitral
awards, these avenues of redress against an award are dead-ends. As to

directly challenging an award and seeking that it be set aside, most

'

countries have enacted legislation which follows the UNCITRAL Model
Law for review of international arbitral awards.140 It limits recourse against
arbitral awards - that is, their being set aside - to the very rare instances
of gross transgressions such as lack of notice, excess of jurisdiction,
unarbitrability, or where the award is in conflict with public policy.' 4
As to resisting enforcement, the situation is similar. Most nations have
ratified the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (known widely as the "New York
Convention"). Under it, contracting states are committed to recognize and
enforce foreign arbitral awards as expeditiously as they do domestic

139. In UNCITRAL and AF arbitration proceedings, tribunals must determine a "place of
arbitration," wherein the award will be deemed "made" for the purposes of review and
enforcement. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules arts. 16, 21. Such a "place" may be a legal fiction in
that the actual arbitration proceedings, and the underlying facts giving rise thereto, may occur
elsewhere.
140. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
141. See id. arts. 34(2)(a) & (b).
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awards.14 2 The grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement mirror
those rare and egregious scenarios mentioned above in the context of
setting aside applications under the UNCITRAL Model Law. 4 3
From personal experience,"1 4 I can say that as a practical matter these
limited grounds for challenge are prohibitive and make the process largely
worthless. Lawyers with appellate experience know that review is futile
without some ability to review the facts or the overall rightness of a
decision based on the totality of the law and evidence, and whether serious
errors were made in either regard. Judges and arbitrators render decisions
that they believe are right and just, and do not want to have them
overturned. To ensure their sanctity, they will structure awards in a manner
that leaves little room for reviewing courts to second-guess.
The possibility for mischief and intellectual dishonesty is real.
Arbitrators who wish to be review-proof may simply ignore or distort
facts, and on the basis of that skewed view of reality, proceed to decide the
case with impeccable legal reasoning and grounding - and certainly not
in a manner that could ever be characterized as an excess of jurisdiction.
With no right to challenge errors of law or unsupported findings of fact,

the party of the losing side has no real hope of overturning even egregious
decisions. The mere fact that arbitral rules require written, reasoned
awards is of very little assistance in the unclear, open world of investor

protection norms where "[c]ustomary international law allows a decisionmaker to draw upon (or ignore) many sources in crafting reasons. In
dealing with these [NAFTA investor-state] claims, arbitrators are even less
constrained than they normally are in the absence of effective review.""'
I would make the point even stronger by reminding the reader that written
reasons are of little use when even gross recorded errors of law and fact
are not grounds for setting aside an award.
142. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention), June 10, 1958, art. III, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.
kentlaw.edu/perritt/conflicts/nycmain.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004).
143. Id. art. V.
144. The most recent and notorious case involving national court review is Metalclad- a case
I participated in on behalf of Mexico during both the arbitral and judicial review proceedings.
While that court did find an excess of jurisdiction in respect of the tribunal's analysis of article
1105, it was not able to review many of Mexico's other essential complaints, namely, gross
distortions and errors of fact and law. In any event, the Supreme Court of British Columbia also
upheld the arbitral tribunal's finding (of one paragraph) in respect of the expropriatory effect of an
ecological decree, and the award amount remained essentially undisturbed, save for a small
adjustment on pre-award interest. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Tribunal Decision (Aug. 30, 2000), rev'd in part, United Mexican States v.
Metalclad Corp. (2001) B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 (Sup. Ct. B.C.).
145. Lerner, supra note 31, at 289.
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(2) The ICSID Annulment Mechanism and its Shortcomings
Awards rendered in arbitration proceedings submitted pursuant to the
ICSID Convention proper are subject to annulment under its article 52.'46
The effect of annulment is the quashing of the award, and the constitution
of a new tribunal at the request of either party.1 47 Annulment grounds are
specifically listed and limited to improper tribunal constitution, excess of
powers, arbitrator corruption, fundamental violations of procedure, and the
award's failure to state reasons.' 48 As provided in article 53(1), awards
under this mechanism are intended to be entirely self-contained, and
divorced from any national court scrutiny.' 49 As to enforcement, article
54(1) mandates that "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an award
rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State.""o

In practice, these annulment grounds seem to offer more hope for
counsel seeking review than those provided by either the UNCITRAL
Model Law or the New York Convention. If one accepts the notion that the
annulment decisions are "correct," the experience to date of the ad hoc
Committees demonstrates (at least numerically) the need for real review:
four of the five awards that have proceeded through committee decision
have been annulled (excluding two instances where annulment was sought

for a second time and denied as against the award of the second
tribunal)."' An eighty percent reversal rate is extremely high for any
146. ICSID Convention, supra note 20.
147. Id. art. 52(6).
148. See id. art. 52(1).
149. Id. art. 53(1) ("The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any
appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention."). This deprivation of
any domestic remedies against ICSID awards is cited as the rationale behind the Committee
annulment process (". . . an award is not open to attack on any ground in the Court of the
Contracting State. Because of this, the drafters of the Convention felt it proper to provide special
remedies...."). 1986 ICSID Annual Report, at 4, cited in David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality
in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal,
ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 21, 35 n.37 (1992).

150. Id. art. 54(1).
151. See Compaflfa de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Case No. ARB/97/3)
Decision on Annulment (July 3, 2002) 41 I.L.M. 1135 (2002); Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of
Indon. (Case No. ARB/81 /1) Decision on Annulment (May 16, 1986); Klockner Industrie-Anlagen
GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon (Case No. ARB/81/2) Decision on Annulment (May 3,
1985); Mar. Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea (Case No. ARB/84/4) Decision
on Annulment (Dec. 22, 1989); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Case No. ARB/98/4)
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appellate body. The figure certainly belies any notion that investor-state
tribunals are worthy of significant deference from review bodies on the
ground that arbitrator expertise makes errors unlikely. These overturned
ICSID panel decisions were made by the very same arbitrators who have
sat, are sitting, or will sit on other investor-state proceedings under the AF
or UNCITRAL that do not have the benefit of annulment.
Nonetheless, ICSID annulment, while preferable to the alternatives,
falls short of being a genuinely effective review process. First, annulment
grounds under article 52 still offer no remedy against tribunals who err
even patently - in their interpretation and application of the law, much

less their conclusions on facts. As noted by one commentator,
"[a]nnulment ... particularly in the case of arbitration, focuses not on the
correctness of the decision, but rather more narrowly considers whether,
regardless of errors in application of law or determination of fact, the
decision resulted from a legitimate process.""5 2 The most recent committee
decision itself noted that "an ad hoc Committee is not a court of appeal
... its competence extends only to annulment based on one or other of the
grounds expressly set out in Article 52.""53 Such a limited scope of review
is unacceptable outside the context of purely private commercial
arbitration, where the interests of affording the parties quick and dirty
justice predominate and where the parties have each freely chosen to forgo
review. As discussed further below, besides the injustice inflicted on the
disputing parties, facially erroneous investor-state awards bring disrepute
to the system as a whole, and wreak havoc on future tribunals and litigants
faced with bad law awards that invariably will be cited by future parties,
and must then be either disingenuously distinguished, or deliberately
disavowed.
Second, as it is the investor that chooses the arbitral mechanism, his
decision to select any of the non-convention options will mean that no
annulment review is available for either side. For the reasons described
above, this means that the investor - in effect - has a veto over whether
either side will have any real right of review." 4 Consider how the
claimants' decision to proceed under UNCITRAL in the Lauder/CMEand
Czech Republic arbitrations may have contributed to that fiasco."'
Decision on Annulment (Feb. 5, 2002). Annulment was sought and denied as against the second
tribunals' awards in Klockner and Amco.
152. Caron, supra note 149, at 24.
153. Vivendi, 41 I.L.M. 1135 162.
154. Unless the treaty provides that claims can only be submitted under the ICSID Convention
mechanism. My own review of BITs suggests that such treaties are fairly rare.
155. See Ronald S. Lauder Commences ArbitrationAgainst Czech Republic, PR NEWSWIRE,

Aug. 23, 1999; CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, Sept. 13, 2001,
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Moreover, for those nations (and the investors who sue them) who have
not ratified the ICSID Convention (including Canada and Mexico),
proceedings thereunder are simply not available.
But more fundamentally, the entire framework misses the point of
intra-body review in that there is no hierarchal relationship between the
reviewing and first instance decision-makers. Annulment committee
members - like the tribunal arbitrators whose work they are reviewing
are composed from essentially the same group of private lawyers and law
professors, and are not required (nor even expected) to have any additional
expertise or erudition in matters of international law or arbitration.15 6
Although Committee members are required to be listed on the ICSID
Panel of Arbitrators, in practice these listed individuals often sit also as
first instance tribunal members on other claims. The very same persons
can sit or have sat simultaneously as arbitrators in regular ICSID
proceedings and on annulment committees. Thus, it is virtually the same
lawyers and professors reviewing each other's work, without even the
patina that the appellate group has any greater claim to wisdom in
decision-making, as implicitly is assumed in any adjudicative system that
includes an internal appeal mechanism.

available at http://www.mfcr.cz/static/Arbitraz/en/PartialAward.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2004).
The three relevant states in those cases - the United States, the Netherlands, and the Czech
Republic have all ratified the ICSID Convention. Presumably (although I have not been able to
confirm this by review of the treaties), the applicable BITs offered ICSID proceedings as an option.
156. See ICSID Convention, supra note 20. The relevant provisions on the requirements and
qualifications in respect of the selection of arbitrators for ICSID tribunals (first instance) and ad hoc
annulment committees are found in articles 12-14, 39-40, and 52(3). ICSID tribunal arbitrators may
come either from the ICSID's Panel of Arbitrators as appointed by each of the contracting states,
or from outside in which case they are required to possess the same qualities as those of the panel
of arbitrators as set out in article 14(1):
Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral character
and recognized competence in the Fields of law, commerce, industry or finance,
who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment. Competence in the
Field of law shall be of particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel
or Arbitrators.
Id. Under article 52(3), the three ad hoc annulment committee members are all to come from the
panel of arbitrators, and are not to be nationals of either the disputing state party or of the state of
the disputing investor. Besides these restrictions, the competence and moral character requirements
are identical as between the two types of panels.
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(3) The Fallacy that Arbitral Review is Unnecessary
Some commentators have argued against any review mechanism. In the
context of his criticism of a Canadian court's review of the NAFTA
Chapter 11 Metalclad case,5 7 Charles Brower II asserts that "arbitration
should mark the end - and not the beginning - of investor-state disputes.
The prospect of lengthy annulment proceedings by itself threatens to
diminish investor confidence by preventing the speedy resolution of
disputes with host states."" 8
This is a facile assertion that ignores the realities of arbitral decisionmaking. All civilized systems of justice recognize that tribunals of first
instance are subject to erring - sometimes grossly - and that there
should be a corrective mechanism. Arbitral panels are no different (the socalled problem of "aberrant" decisions).'" Why should state parties and
investors not have this right under BITs? For the former, these cases often

touch upon vital matters of social policy, sovereignty and even democracy,

'

and for both sides, millions and sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars
are at stake.1 60 These are not run-of-the-mill commercial arbitration claims.
As to concerns over "speedy resolution," Brower ignores the fact that the
Metalclad arbitration period before the ICSID took almost four years,' 6
whilst the review court in Canada only took seven months from the filing
of the review application to final decision. Other experienced practitioners
and scholars see the exclusion of any possibility of arbitral award review
(as Belgium had legislated) as "an intriguing but misguided experiment,
likely to do more harm than good to fair and efficient international dispute
resolution."' 6 2 Even the most avid proponents of investor-state arbitration,
including investor-claimant attorneys, have argued publicly in favor of
arbitral review for mere "errors of law."' 6 3
157. The Metalclad tribunal chose Vancouver, British Columbia as the formal "place of
arbitration." The reviewing court was the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
158. Charles H. Brower II, Investor-StateDisputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back,
40 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 85-86 (2001).
159. Lugard, supra note 28, at 498 (comments of David Small).
160. See CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings (showing where the
tribunal awarded the investor over $354 million USD).
161. From the formal submission of the claim to arbitration,until the ruling by the tribunal (a
full year after the oral hearing had concluded).
162. William W. Park, The InternationalizationofLaw andLegal Practice:NationalLaw and
Commercial Justice: SafeguardingProceduralIntegrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L.

REV. 647,650 (1989).
163. See The Impact ofFederalism:BorderIssues in Canadian and US. Relations: Hearings
Before the House of RepresentativesSubcomm. on Trade/Hearingson the Outcome of the Summit
of the Americas and Prospectsfor Free Trade in the Hemisphere, CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7 (2001)
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b. The Prospect of Inconsistent and Uncertain Jurisprudence
(1) The Inherent Difficultly in Ascertaining International Law and in
Forging Clear Norms Under Existing Investment Treaties
The need for some kind of institutional appellate voice is not just
important to particular litigants in individual cases. The glut of new claims
and the effect they may have on respondent states demand it. These

tribunals are at the forefront of emerging new norms for the protection of
aliens under international law, and it behooves all participants to ensure
that these rules are elucidated judiciously. Their decisions will affect how
governments regulate foreign investors, many of whom are engaged in
commercial activities that alarm the public sentiment independent of
nationality concerns.'
Public international law is largely devoid of hard, black letter norms.
The language of BITs themselves (fair and equitable treatment; full
protection and security; and just compensation), and the principles of
international law which they incorporate, do little to clarify the

uncertainty. While there may be some consensus on the sources of
international law as set out in article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice,16 5 they do not provide the relatively clear and predictable
delineation of legal rules that one would expect, for example, from a
sophisticated domestic legal system's commercial and regulatory law.
Respected publicists and arbitrators write of the "disarray of the
international law of international investment."' 66 Others have noted that
"the international arena lacks a hierarchical structure of institutions, and
the problem of finding the law is much more complicated."1 67

(testimony of Daniel M. Price). Beyond the desirability of this corrective function, Price notes that
a review/appellate body would also serve to provide a "coherent body of jurisprudence," and to
avoid the balkanization that would occur if multiple national courts are left to review the Free Trade
Area of Americas arbitral awards. Id.
164. Chapter 11 and BITs cases to date show a disproportional number of claims involving
such kinds of sensitive investment activities as construction oftourist facilities on ancient historical
sites; hazardous waste treatment, confinement and export; production of carcinogenic fuel
additives; water treatment facilities; and even a scheme for the bulk exportation of fresh water.
165. Under this provision, sources of international law are stated to be: international
conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,
judicial decisions, and the writings of publicists.
166. LOWENFELD, supra note 6, at 444.
167. Lerner, supra note 31, at 248.
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(2) Some Real World Examples

(a) NAFTA and Article 1105 ("Fair and Equitable and Full
Protection and Security")
NAFTA's Chapter 11 - by far the most active of the investor-state
instruments - provides a good example of how even only a few years of
arbitral litigation has led to the uncertainty and inconsistency as to the
meaning of its most controversial and hotly-disputed protective provisions
- fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security under
article 1105. Two lawyers actively involved in several of the early cases
published their analysis of the leading cases as of late 2001,168 all of which
had found violations of the "fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security" standards under totally different factual
circumstances, noting that
[t]he initial arbitral and judicial considerations of Article 1105 have
been remarkably divergent .. . [t]he standard of fair treatment has
ranged from broad considerations of "fairness" and a duty to
remove all doubt and uncertainty respecting all domestic legal
requirements for initiating, completing and successfully operating
investments, to, at the other end of the spectrum, the extremely high
threshold stipulated by the minimum standard of treatment at
customary international law.'16

&

168. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Tribunal
Decision (Aug. 30, 2000), rev'd. in part, The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (2001)
B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 (Sup. Ct. B.C.); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov't of Can. (Nov. 13, 2000); Pope
Talbot, Inc. v. Gov't of Can., Award on the Merits, Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001).
169. Foy & Deane, supra note 4, at 329. Note that since the publication of that article, there
have been additional arbitralconsiderations of article 1105. Firstly, in Mondev, the tribunal directly
assessed (and dismissed) a denial of justice claim. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States of America
(Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2). As discussed above, denial ofjustice is a well-recognized (although not
well-delineated) customary or general principle of international law that is also subsumed under
notions of"fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." Thus, the Mondev tribunal
was not assessing facts that would support an article 1105 claim in any novel context. In ADF
Group Inc. v. United States of America (Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1), the facts were likewise not
conducive to an article 1105 analysis. ADF Group, Inc. v. U.S., available at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/16586.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2003) (showing court document of
ADF). The case involved a government procurement claim where the tribunal found that a
reservation had been made by the United States. In fact, the tribunal seemed entirely reticent to
open the article 1105 can of worms. See id. ¶ 186 ("We adopt the prudential approach of Mondev
that, for the purposes of resolving the dispute before this Tribunal, there is no need to resolve all
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In fact, the divergence was so troubling to the NAFTA parties that they
resorted to the treaty's extraordinary Chapter 20 Commission powers that
enables state parties to issue interpretative rulings that are "binding" on
investor-state arbitration panels." 0 The main thrust of the Commission's
"Notes of Interpretation"' 7 ' was to explicitly limit the scope of article 1105
to the more conservative customary international law minimum, thereby
putting the brakes on contentions that the language was meant to confer a
purely subjective "fairness and equity" jurisdiction upon tribunals.'7 2
For a variety reasons, this palliative remedy will not assist parties to
other investment treaties.'7 3 First, BITs do not have the equivalent of the
quasi-institutional Chapter 20 body and leave all decisions to the ad hoc
arbitration panels. The only prospect of any kind of concerted action by

the member states would be by actual amendment of the treaty -

a

remote, improbable scenario. The dynamic under NAFTA leading to the
joint interpretative ruling is unlikely to be replicated in any BIT context
between a developing and an industrialized country. Their interests are
necessarily diverse and sometimes in opposition with the former receiving
the FDI (and thus being on the defendant/respondent end of claims), and
the latter seeking to protect their investors. This zero-sum dynamic did not
apply to the NAFTA circumstance where there was more than one
industrialized, capital-exporting country as a party. In the case of the
United States and Canada, at the time of the interpretation and now, each
issues raised, directly or impliedly, by one or the other party in oral argument or in written
pleadings concerning the allegation of violation of Article 1105(1)").
170. See supra text accompanying note 137 (discussing NAFTA's Chapter 20). Article
1131(2) provides that a Commission interpretation on the meaning of the treaty's investment
protection provisions is "binding on aTribunalestablished under this Section."NAFTA, supra note
137, art. 1131(2).
171. Canadian Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade, Trade Negotiations and
Agreements, availableat http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-en.asp (last visited Apr.
29, 2003).
172. Foy & Deane, supra note 4, at 316.
173. As a result of some dicta from NAFTA Chapter 11, the Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov't of
Canada UNCITRAL panel, there was even some doubt as to whether the interpretative ruling
would even assist the NAFTA parties themselves. That tribunal considered the effect of the
interpretation - which came down whilst the case was still proceeding - and had the temerity to
question whether it was a "valid exercise of the Commission's power of interpretation" or an
improper amendment and therefore not binding. Pope & Talbot, Inc. V. Gov't of Can., Award on
Damages (May 31, 2002), available athttp://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/phases-en.asp#comm
(last visited Apr. 29, 2004). It managed to avoid the question head-on, noting that if it were
"required to make a determination whether the Commission's action is an interpretation or an
amendment, it would choose the latter." Id. § 47. Subsequent tribunals have not so questioned the
commission actions, and have accepted the binding nature of the interpretation. See Mondev Int'l
Ltd. v. United States of America (Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2); ADF (Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1).
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was subject to hundreds of millions of dollars worth of claims from the
other's investors (but not from Mexican investors who to date have yet to
submit a claim). Many of these claims pleaded article 1105 as the primary
ground of liability, including novel legal theories which happily found a

home under the vague and unbounded notions of fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security. Finally, even if agreement could
be reached at the executive level, there is no guarantee that each country's

local legislative body would ratify the amendments.
(b) The Lauder-Czech UNCITRAL Cases: Let Chaos Reign
This example from NAFTA pales by comparison to what has recently
transpired in a pair of BIT-based UNCITRAL proceedings submitted
against the Czech Republic.' United States investor Ronald Lauder-the
inheritor of cosmetics manufacturer Estee-Lauder - submitted two
separate but "virtually identical claims"' in respect of a media joint
venture project in the Czech Republic. One was submitted pursuant to the
U.S.-Czech treaty in his own name on the basis of his nationality, and the
other under the Netherlands-Czech BIT on behalf of his local investment
entity, the Dutch-incorporated CME Czech Republic B.V. The underlying
facts and claims are long and complex. For present purposes, it suffices to
say that they relate to Lauder's contention that his company was squeezedout of a successful and highly profitable joint venture broadcasting
business due to actions and inactions of a state regulatory body called the
Media Council. Each claim alleged the same violations of each treaty
(including, inter alia, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and
security, expropriation), whose provisions in turn were almost identical.
Lauder was initiated first on August 19, 1999. During this first
proceeding, the Czech Republic refused consent to having each claim
heard together in one proceeding before a single panel,' and insisted on
the constitution of a different panel for the subsequent CME case; a
decision that it would eventually regret. The submission of the CME claim
followed thereafter on February 22, 2000. The Lauder final award came
down first on September 3, 2001, ruling in favor of the Czech Republic
and denying all claims for damages. CME followed ten days later, on
September 13, 2001, with the majority of the panel holding that it was not
174. Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Final Award, (Sept. 3,
2001); CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial
Award, (Sept. 13,2001); id. (Hndl, A., dissenting opinion) (Sept. 11, 2001). The full text of these
documents is available at http://www.mfcr.cz/indexen.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2004).
175. CME,1412.
176. Lauder, ¶ 173.
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bound by Lauder, and finding that the Czech Republic had breached five
separate provisions of the treaty, including "fair and equitable
treatment,"' "full protection and security," 7 8 and expropriation.'7 9 On
March 14, 2003, the tribunal issued a substantial total damages award in

favor of CME of $354,655,752 USD.

-

For a complete picture of the chaos, it is necessary to return to
September, 2001. In a separate opinion dated September 11, 2001, the
Czech-appointed arbitrator in the second CME claim, Jaroslav Hndl,
unleashed his own wave of vituperative in what can only be described as
a scathing dissent. In it, he broadly accuses the other two arbitrators
including a former President of the International Court of Justice, Judge
Stephen M. Schwebel - of unethical conduct, including bias, and secretly
colluding with one another and discriminating against him in a manner
which deprived him of his opportunity to duly participate in the
deliberations and preparation of the award. 8 0 Not surprisingly, the Czech
Republic challenged the award in the Svea (Appellate) Court of Sweden
in Stockholm, the place of arbitration. During that proceeding, Judge
Schwebel and the other two arbitrators testified as to the allegations of
arbitrator misconduct. The challenge was ultimately dismissed on May 15,

2003.181
Such an unseemly episode of disarray was probably unavoidable under
the free-floating investor-state model. As alluded to earlier, the investors
chose to file proceedings under the UNCITRAL Rules, thereby depriving
the parties of the prospect of some guidance from an ICSID Annulment
Committee, although precisely how a committee or the ICSID secretariat
could have staved off the embarrassing and predictable consequence of
entirely inconsistent awards on identical facts is not clear. What is clear is
that some mechanism was missing to clear up the mess early on. It is
inconceivable that this result could have occurred under any reasonably
functioning national court system, or under international dispute resolution
bodies such as the WTO or ICJ. The debacle demonstrates that with no
corrective capacity either in the form of any appellate or internal
institutional body, and no guaranteed amendment mechanism, BITs and
their contracting states lay at the mercy of private-lawyer arbitrators, who
177. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Between the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Apr. 29, 1991, art. 3(1).
178. Id. art. 3(2).
179. Id. art. 5.
180. CME, (Handl, A., dissenting opinion) at pp. 1-23.
181. Translation of Swedish Court of Appeal Judgement, available at http://www.cetv-net.
com/ne/articlefiles/439-english_translation_ofthe_sveajudgment.pdf(last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
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may or may not possess the necessary wisdom and sensibility to prudently
interpret and apply the agreements.
2. Systemic and Procedural Flaws
a. The Decision-Making and Remuneration of Arbitrators
(1) Perverse Financial Incentives Promoting Nonjudicious Approach
to Resolution
As private lawyers and law professors, investor-state arbitrators are
paid by the hour at rates commensurate with their reputations and
experience, and to some extent, with what they bill out other client
matters. Fees range from a low-floor of $2400 per day per arbitratoras set
by the ICSID in its most recent Schedule of Fees,' up to, from my own
experience only, $600 USD per hour in cases where the parties agree to
top-off the ICSID rates, or in UNCITRAL arbitrations where fees are not
prescribed. Arbitrators' allegiances are to their law firms. Their billing
requirements make it impossible for them to approach a case in the same
way ajudge or other decision-makers do when they have no financial stake
either in the existence of the claim itself, nor in its prolonged duration.
In and of itself, the generous remuneration of the panelists is not a
problem per se. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the BIT arbitral
system, in paying its adjudicators by the hour and without any overall time
limits, financially rewards the continuation and prolonging of proceedings.
No enlightened domestic judicial system would tolerate such incentives
which unavoidably (and perhaps unconsciously) favor the party advancing
the claim. Even assuming - as I do - that arbitrators conduct themselves
in good faith, the compensation regime runs the risk of creating the
impression that decisions may be affected by the arbitrators'own personal
financial interests. When dispensing justice, appearance of absolute
propriety is as necessary as the real thing.
(2) Arbitrator Bias
Parties choose arbitratorswith "shared nationality or legal, political, or
economic outlook."' Depending on a particular arbitrator'sview of his
role vis-a-vis the party selecting him, he may well believe that his function
182. See ICSID, Schedule of Fees, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/schedule/
fees.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2004).
183. Lerner, supra note 31, at 283.
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is not limited to that of independent arbiter of law and fact, but also that
of advocate. While under arbitral rules, arbitrators are to be disinterested
and independent of the parties,' 4 there are no guidelines on what this
means in practice. Party-appointed arbitrators may well have been
interviewed prior to their selection' (apparently, this is not atypical in
American arbitration practice)' 8 6 or may have had (or still have) a personal
or professional relationship with the appointing disputant, and, at a bare
minimum, will hold some degree of gratitude for that side for the prestige
and financial compensation that will accrue from sitting on an
international arbitration panel.
The notion of adjudicator as advocate for one side'8 ' is unseemly in
international proceedings involving a state party. Once the pleadings are
closed, and the matter proceeds to hearing, investor-state arbitration takes
on the essence of common law litigation, including adversariness (which
is present from the outset). All advocacy, accordingly, should remain in
the hands of counsel. While it is one thing to choose a panelist with shared
nationality and other ties in order to bring a needed perspective to
deliberations, it is quite another to have panelists (as there have been, for
example, in Chapter 11 proceedings) blatantly appear to favor one side
over the other.
Bias concerns are also now increasingly being raised up-front by
counsel in BIT proceedings against what can only be described as very
cushy relationships between certain counsel-arbitrators who practice on
both sides of the bench. I invite readers to review published awards and the
names of the panelists and participating and consulting lawyers. They will
see that many leading and frequently-appointed arbitrators also act as
counsel for either investor-claimants or respondent-governments. This has
raised the genuine concern - and formal objection in some cases - over
the potential for favoritism in circumstances where X counsel appoints Y
lawyer as arbitrator in one case, and then Y, acting simultaneously or at
some point in the future as counsel for a party on another claim, returns the
favor and appoints X as arbitrator in that second case. To date, to the best
of my knowledge, all objections and expressions of concern over this
practice have been dismissed and the arbitrators have not resigned their
184. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules arts. 9-10.
185. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International
Controversies:Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 59 (1995).
186. See Detlev F. Vagts, The InternationalLegal Profession:A Needfor More Governance?,

90 AM. J. INT'L L. 250, 259 (1996) ("American courts and the drafters of U.S. state laws have
regarded party-appointed arbitrators in effect as advocates of those who appointed them").
187. This is to be distinguished from judicial advocates in the civil law and EU traditionsthat
have inquisitorial or advocacy roles for court officials but who maintain no favor for either party.
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appointments. Again, there may well have been proper and sound
motivations for the particular appointment unrelated to the previous
relationship, but the practice does not necessarily need to cause actual bias
on part of the arbitratorto reasonably lead to its perception.'"
(3) Secrecy of Proceedings
Investor-state arbitration proceedings are usually conducted in secret,
with no easy public access available to the pleadings, let alone the oral
hearings.' 9 As a practical matter, unless the tribunal and the disputing
parties agree, the hearings, pleadings, and very existence of a case may not
be available to the public. Awards can even be difficult to track down,
especially if proceedings were filed under some regime other than the

ICSID.
Some feebly argue the benefits of secrecy in arbitration proceedings
involving governments. They are wrong. That which the government and
business seek to hide is precisely that which the public usually needs to
know. Barrister K.V.S.K. Nathan sets out the debate and his own
conclusions from the perspectives of corporate and state parties as follows:
The justification for privacy in arbitration proceedings has never
been clearly understood and it may be suggested that a demand for
privacy in international transactions merely helps to cloak shady
deals, sharp practices, and adventures. Often, the call for privacy is
a device to protect the principals involved from unwelcome
concerns of small shareholders in the case of large corporations and
keep the public ignorant of the state's actions in the cases where a
state or state entity is involved. From an international public policy
point of view and as a control generally of arbitration proceedings
188. Compare Understanding on Rules and Procedures Govering the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art.8,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU] with id. art. 17. In the case of the selection and compensation regime, panelists
are selected by the secretariat, not the parties (although, if possible, with their agreement), and the
pay has been described as relatively "modest, compared for example to the pay of members of
tribunals in international commercial arbitration...." Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 162. The
appellate body is composed of seven members, three of whom are chosen at random to serve as a
chamber for appeals. See DSU, supra art. 17. They are appointed for multi-year terms and serve
in that capacity on virtual "full-time" basis. Id. at 167.
189. Canada and the United States - suddenly themselves subject to a deluge of claims under
Chapter 11 - have relatively recently opened the process considerably, even going so far as to
agree to a public hearing in two cases. I am not aware of other countries doing anything similar.
See supra text accompanying note 130.
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and the conduct of arbitrators, it may be argued that there should be
a maximum transparency particularly in international arbitration
proceedings involving a state or state entity and a foreign legal or
natural person.' 90
At the risk of being repetitive, I remind the reader that investor-states
cases often have serious public policy implications. There is no real
defensible argument to be made to keep these claims in the dark. Concerns
by investors over commercial secrets, or governments over sensitive state
secrets can and have easily been dealt with by tribunals directing that
particular evidence or testimony be kept confidential.
(4) Speed and Costs

'

Investment claims are notoriously drawn out and expensive. While
each party would have to pay out its own legal fees and disbursements
under any adjudicative regime, under BIT arbitration they also must pay
for the hourly services of the decision-makers as described earlier. There
are travel and lodging costs associated with bringing together a panel from
all over the world to attend hearings and deliberations in some of the
world's most expensive cities (in the case of ICSID-based arbitration,
usually Washington or Paris). These cases can involve thousands of pages
of documents; at least two rounds of complete legal pleadings, with
usually several others if there are jurisdictional challenges or requests for
interim measures; and at least one full oral hearing. The arbitrator fees and
expenses are now typically amounting to about $1 million per case,' 9
which is shared by each side and paid up-front as the case proceeds. The
slow pace at which the proceedings unfold and decisions are rendered can
be equally frustrating for all sides. Matters of logistics, the lack of strict
time rules for the bringing of claims to hearing and issuing of awards, and
any number of other intangible factors make the average resolution time
from the date the claims are registered to the date of dispatch of the final

190. K.V.S.K. NATHAN, ICSID CONVENTION: THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 2 (2000).
191. See CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration,
Partial Award (Sept. 13, 2001), at 177 (showing a published account); UNCITRAL Arbitration
Proceedings, availableathttp://www.cety-net.com/ne/articlefiles/439-cme-cr_ eng.pdf(last visited
Oct. 20, 2003) (indicating that the costs for the tribunal's fees and disbursements then amounted
to $1,096,498.86). This amount did not cover the subsequent cost for the later damages hearing and
award. Id.
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award almost always over two years, and usually much more.1 92 In short,
this form of arbitration is neither speedy nor cost effective.
b. The Procedural Vacuum
Most investor-state proceedings bear no resemblance to the genteel
world of state-to-state dispute resolution before such bodies as the WTO
where only government counsel are permitted to appear, and where factfinding plays a limited role. Investor claims can be as hotly disputed and
aggressively litigated as any U.S.-style domestic civil suit, with each side
accusing the other of serious impropriety.' 93 For there to be a genuinely
fair and true resolution over such disputes, clear, effective and consistent
rules of procedure - knowable in advance - are a must. This is why
most sophisticated legal systems have such lengthy, detailed procedural
codes or practices. While these can be unwieldy, they are essential to an
orderly and fair process.
Investor-state arbitral rules are lauded by proponents for their
"flexibility"1 94 - a euphemism for the fact that there are no precise
guidelines for those critically important kinds of issues that fill the motion
dockets of civil court registries. All the arbitration rules associated with
the different arbitral mechanisms speak in very general terms, reserve
near-complete discretion to the arbitral panel, and fail to set out clear and
firm procedural requirements backed up by the threat of sanction in the
event of noncompliance. With the contribution from many different legal
traditions to these arbitral rules, and their intended use by parties from all
corners of the world and all legal systems, the lack of precision is hardly
surprising, and probably inevitable. Indeed, outside of the context of a
national legal system that includes the police-enforced judicial power to
order and sanction, most of the problem-areas discussed below are largely
unavoidable in proceedings before international tribunals. These few are
merely examples of those I have personally encountered on a recurring
basis.
(1) Document Production
It is axiomatic that effective dispute resolution requires an accurate
presentation of fact. This cannot be achieved without full and fair
192. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, supra note 132.
193. See infra Part VI.B.2.c (for a further discussion of this phenomenon in the Latin
American context).
194. See, e.g., IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration,

pmbl. (Int'l Bar Assoc. 1999) [hereinafter IBA Rules].
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document production. This type of evidence takes on added significance
in international arbitration proceedings which tend to be much more
document-based than a typical common law trial. Yet, there are no clear
and firm mandates governing arbitrators and parties insofar as their rights
and duties in this regard. Matters of production are left entirely to the
discretion of the tribunal. On request, or ex mero moto, the tribunal may
direct production, including an admonition that the failure to produce may
lead to the appropriate adverse inference. Whether or not (and how and
when) documents are called upon to be produced will usually depend on

the president's background and predilection on the topic -

a fundamental

point, but something over which there are profoundly different approaches
from amongst the world's legal traditions.
The result is endless haggling over the scope of requests and orders to
produce. But the real problem goes beyond haggling - a typical feature
of civil litigation in many countries. With no formal power of compulsion
to order document inspection, and no discovery or deposition process to
allow parties to ferret out the existence or nonexistence of classes of
documents held by the other side, there is simply no reasonable degree of
assurance that all relevant materials have been disclosed by all sides.

Unfortunately, the honor system is not a workable basis for disclosure in
investor-state claims. Parties can deny that documents exist, and unless the
denial is patently untenable, the documents will remain undisclosed, at no

cost to the concealing side.
(2) Presentation of Witness Testimony
(a) Advance Written Statements and Nonattending Witnesses
Proceedings are divided into a written and then oral phase. During the
former, witness statements are submitted along with other documents and
pleadings. Statements are prepared entirely by the party (and its lawyers)
furnishing the testimony. Prior to the oral phase - the evidentiary hearing
the parties are called upon to indicate which witnesses of the other side

they wish to cross-examine.
This approach has several shortcomings. First, statements are carefully
prepared with the assistance of counsel, leaving the opponent without a
genuine sense of whether the substance of a witness' testimony merits
cross-examination or not, let alone consideration of other indicia of
credibility that would come from a deposition or some other pre-hearing
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encounter. 1' Time constraints during the oral hearing (each side is usually
allotted the same amount of time) make it impossible for parties to call all
witnesses and they are left to select only those key participants on the basis
of an inauthentic sense of their knowledge of the facts.

Equally serious is the problem of the nonattending witness, and what
to do with the testimony he has submitted in his witness statement. In
principle, the tribunal is to disregard such witness' statement, and proceed
on the basis as if it did not exist. However, this approach is not uniformly
followed and the tribunal reserves the discretion to accept the written
evidence, notwithstanding the witness' refusal or inability to appear for
cross-examination.' 6 There are no firm principles guiding a tribunal in
these circumstances,' 7 and one side may well face the prospect of having
to challenge evidence without ever having had any opportunity for any
form of confrontation. Again, as with document production, the root of this
problem rests in the absence of a genuine subpoena power.
Finally - albeit less seriously - with no prior ability to depose or
otherwise acquire information from opposing-side witnesses, disputants

effectively face them cold at the oral hearing. While witness statements are
supposed to be complete and contain all information to be relied on by the
presenting side, they rarely do. Witnesses are invariably granted the
opportunity to complement their statements with additional direct evidence
that the other side might be hearing for the first time.
(b) Witness Truth-Telling and Tribunals' Aversion to

Deciding on Credibility
Investor-state claims often present radically opposing versions of fact,
including on sensitive and material matters that tribunals must eventually
rule on. These are not mere nuances in the evidence that can be explained
by the passage of time and inherent frailties in human perception and
195. Many legal systems acknowledge this and do not permit the submission of advance
witness statements, including in civil law jurisdictions such as Germany. See Karl-Heinz
Bockstiegal, Presenting Evidence in International Arbitration, ICSID REV. -

FOREIGN

INVESTMENT L.J. 1, 2 (Spring 2001).
196. This is precisely what occurred during the Metalcladproceeding in respect of one of the
investor's key witnesses, notwithstanding that earlier in the proceeding the tribunal had discarded
the testimony of one of Mexico's witnesses who failed to appear. In CME, the tribunal also decided
to rely upon the written testimony of a nonattending witness.
197. The IBA Rules codify this approach in article 4(8): "If a witness who has submitted a
Witness Statement does not appear without a valid reason for testimony at an Evidentiary Hearing,
except by agreement of the Parties, the Arbitral Tribunal shall disregard the Witness Statement
unless, in exceptional circumstances, the Arbitral Tribunal determines otherwise." IBA Rules, supra
note 194, art. 4(8) (emphasis added).
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memory. Nonetheless, perhaps out of some self-imposed sense of decorum

and desire not to offend, tribunals invariably shy away from making clear
findings against a witness' credibility even where the circumstances cry
out for such. This can result in a muddling of the key factual elements of
a claim. Witnesses themselves are free to amble from the truth as the
compulsion to not perjure is weak at best. Witnesses are sworn in - not
to a judicial or quasi-judicial officer but before the proceeding generally
- upon their honor and conscience to tell the truth. It is doubtful that
prevarication will trigger criminal jeopardy under these circumstances.
In Metalclad, for example, there were multiple and mutual accusations
of malfeasance, including out-and-out corruption. The accusations were

on material, outcome-determinative matters. Yet, even after over one year
of deliberations from the conclusion of the hearing to the dispatch of the
award, the tribunal failed to make any findings on witness credibility, and
entirely shirked its fact-finding responsibility in both avoiding all of the
messiest contentions (e.g., mutual allegations of corruption), and by
prefacing other factual discussions under the rubric of mere assertions,
without ever clarifying that which had been accepted or rejected.
(3) Rules and Sufficiency of Evidence
Under rule 34(1) of the ICSID Convention's Rules of Procedure for
Arbitration Proceedings, the "[t]ribunal shall be the judge of the

admissibility of any evidence adduced and of its probative value."'
Likewise, under article 25(6) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, "[t]he
arbitral tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality
and weight of the evidence offered.""'9 The effect of these non-rules,
combined with the lack of any other complementary jurisprudence or
doctrine, is that neither party has any real sense in advance of how the
tribunal will assess the weight of any particular kind of evidence
(admissibility as such is a non-issue as everything is admissible). In the
investor-state context, this can lead to disconnects between the parties and
arbitrators (and inter se) who come from different legal traditions that
place greater or lesser value on certain classes of evidence - e.g., direct
versus circumstantial, documentary versus testimonial (oral).
In the context of a recently-decided Chapter 11 claim by a U.S. investor
against Mexico, one finds a clear example of how such differences in
perspective were determinative in the divergence of opinion as between
198. ICSID Convention, supra note 20, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule
34(1).
199. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 20, art. 25(6).
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the majority and dissenting opinion on an outcome-conclusive point of
fact. In Feldman,200 all the arbitrators denied the claim on all grounds other
than the national treatment issue. On that point, the chairman and investorappointed arbitrator parted ways with their colleague on whether or not the
claimant's evidence of discrimination was sufficient to make out the claim.
The majority acknowledged that "only a limited amount of relevant factual
information has been presented to the Tribunal,"201 but found a sufficient
amount existed to shift the burden to Mexico:
various international tribunals, including the International Court of
Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the
rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or
respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a
generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law
and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon
the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the
affirmative of a claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence
sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the
burden then shifts to the otherparty, who willfail unless it adduces
20 2
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
On failing to so rebut the presumption, Mexico was held to have
violated NAFTA's national treatment protection, and ordered to pay
damages. The dissenting Mexican arbitrator could not have seen things
more differently, and objected to the majority's approach:
In my opinion, neither-the NAFTA nor international law provide
any grounds to account for the fact that, as in this case, the burden
of proof should shift to the Respondent, as the majority of the
Tribunal suggests in paragraph 177 of the Award, where the
Claimant is said to have established a presumption and a 'prima
facie case.' 2 03

-

In any case, the Tribunal should have based its conclusions on the
facts convincingly and overwhelmingly proven by the Claimant

200. See supra text accompanying note 123.
201. Marvin Feldman, (Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1), ¶ 167.
202. Id. 1 177 (quoting United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts
and Blouses From India, May 23, 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R at 14 (1997)).
203. Id (Covarrubias, A., dissenting opinion) (Dec. 3, 2002), at 9.
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which is not the case here - , including presumptions and
unproven facts only when considering non-essential issues. 204
Finally, even stronger:
Judicial-procedural considerations adopted by the majority in this
case have also left Mexican tax authorities defenseless, . .. [the
investor's claims] . .. should have been supported by extremely
clear and convincing evidence.20 s
The problem here is not whether the evidentiary standard should be clear
and convincing evidence orprimafaciecase or something in between, but
the need that parties know the relevant standard from the outset. Such a
basic and fundamental point as the applicable burden of proof will affect
all manner of decisions that parties make from the very outset when the

claim is first investigated, through to final decisions on what to witnesses
to present and cross-examine.
c. Some Additional Observations on Being a Latin
American Respondent in an Investor-State Claim - Special Challenges
Each of these areas of concern relate to matters of proof and
establishment of facts. These issues are especially problematic in
investment disputes arising out of Latin America given the reality that
many of these ventures spring from corrupt dealings, all the more obscured
by the passage of time from initial investment to arbitration. Corruption in
foreign transactions in Latin America is no secret, and those charged years
later with trying to determine what precisely occurred are stymied by walls
of silence from all sides. Of course, none of the original actors will admit
to anything incriminating. Many will simply not participate. Without any
legal means to compel cooperation, lawyers and especially arbitrators
proceed half-blind.
(1) The Creeping Influence of the Common Law Generally
Before discussing some of these hurdles specifically, the phenomenon
of the predominance of all that is Anglo-Saxon in international
adjudication bears mentioning. In contexts beyond investor-state
arbitration, commentators have noted this trend:
204. Id. at I1 (emphasis in original).
205. Id. at 17.
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The term imperialism, implied to the spread of United States law
and United States lawyering abroad, may be a shade too strong. In
part, what we have is a matter of taste, like the spread of Coca-Cola.
It is perhaps also sheer convenience and the fact that Americans
were in the field [United States law firms in international business]
fairly early, and because their style of lawyering suits the needs of
the international order. 2 06
To confine the cause to U.S. lawyering is not entirely accurate in the
context of investment treaty arbitration. With the disproportionate numbers

of investor-state arbitrators and lawyers from the rest of the common law
world - in particular, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and
Canada - the influence is more broadly Anglo-Saxon. It is likely due not
just to "matter[s] of taste," but to the ubiquity (and thereby convenience)
of the English language, in the same way that it has become the de facto
"lingua franca" 207 in other transnational dispute resolution contexts. Where
only one or even neither of disputing parties, for example, has English as
their native tongue, the parties will nevertheless default to English (and
arbitrators who speak or at least understand English) as the most practical
language in which to conduct proceedings. This predilection spreads even
to the interpretation of the language of the BITs themselves as in some
instances of treaties between Latin American and non-English speaking
countries, English is added as a third official text and deemed to prevail in
the event of a difference in interpretation between the versions of the
languages of the contracting parties. 208
Personally, I am partial to this mode of litigation, with its adversarial
character, and the important role of the oral hearing, including crossexamination. I genuinely believe it is the best model for reaching some
notion of the truth and, ultimately, justice. Many of its features are in fact
present in an investor-state proceeding. Their efficacy notwithstanding,
they can make the process awkward for lawyers from countries like those
in Latin America whose legal tradition is so entirely different. This will
especially be the case for those claims filed by investors from common law

206. Lawrence M. Friedman, Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order, 37 STAN. J. INT'L

L. 347, 356-57 (2001).
207. Kerr, supra note 135, at 172.
208. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of
Paraguay on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1992); Agreement Between
the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1993).
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countries (who invariably will be armed with common law lawyers),
where the president of the tribunal is of the same background.
Even where the English language and Anglo-Saxon methods do not
predominate, the president of the arbitral panel will likely hail from an
OECD-member state in continental Europe, and may not be sensitive to or
cognizant of the legal, economic, cultural, political, and commercial mores
at work in the host state that are the necessary context to any evaluation of
investor treatment. Too often I have seen claimants assert BIT violations
based on allegations of governmental action that from afar - that is, in
first-world hindsight - may appear offensive, when in reality the behavior
entirely accorded with local conditions and with the foreign investor's own
expectations. Where the make-up of a tribunal is dominated by influences
and perspectives from the developed world, those values will permeate all
procedural and substantive aspects of the claim.
(2) Other Particular Challenges
(a) Legal Background
Latin American nations universally are developing and civil law
countries. Litigation in the region is nothing like that in the common law
world, nor even like that in the more industrialized civil law nations of
Western Europe. Comparative legal analysis shows that many of the real
differences between how legal systems operate today is as much a function
of the country's state of development as of the civil versus common law
divide. These differences range from the niceties of weighing and
submitting evidence, to basic procedure, and to the essence of law itself.
As to litigation in particular, oral hearings and viva voce testimony are
virtually nonexistent in Latin America outside criminal and family law

proceedings. Government lawyers representing these countries have to be
mindful of these and other profound differences. The formalism in which
these lawyers were trained and have practiced is largely absent in investor-

state proceedings, especially where there is some common law influence
on the proceedings. There are none of the hallmarks of comprehensive and
detailed civil law codes. Rather, the treaties' vague language cries out for
the practical and reasoned interpretation and lawmaking one sees from
common law lawyers and judges.
(b) Relative Experience of the Participants
Many government lawyers, especially from smaller Latin American
nations, may well be handling an investor-state arbitration for the first
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time. They will unlikely even have litigation experience in their own
countries. In either case, they will have little or no familiarity with the
common law features that tend to govern the final stages of the oral
proceedings, including oral submissions (including questions from the
panel) and witness examination. One close observer from within the
ICSID confirmed to me his own concerns that some of these respondents
are not adequately arguing and preparing their defenses. The problem is
all the more exacerbated when claimant investors are able to hire leading
North American and European law firms staffed with lawyers with ample
experience, many of whom will professionally and personally know the
presiding arbitrators.
Even assuming that they are able to match-up in legal experience, there
are some aspects which no amount of legal expertise can make up for.
Respondent host countries necessarily will have to rely on government
officials from home as their key witnesses, who in turn may be subject to
cross-examination during the oral hearing. Other than what they may see
on English-language television, these persons will have little familiarity
with this and other litigation devices - all of which may come as a culture
shock.209 Most senior officials from major companies (at least in the
United States), on the other hand, will likely have been personally subject
to some kind of interrogation during the course of their careers, will be
much more comfortable with the process, and will thus be more effective
as viva voce witnesses.
(c) Governance and Corruption
As noted, there is usually wide disagreement between the disputants on
the facts, often due to the corrupt origin of the original investment. This,
in turn, makes it next to impossible to find witnesses willing and able to
relate all relevant information. Claimants have exploited this vacuum, for
example, by alleging that government officials gave assurances upon
which the investor relied, only to have them unfulfilled. Respondent
governments in this situation are placed in the position of having to
disprove a negative (assuming the assurances were never made), under
circumstances where their officials have by the time of the claim
disappeared, are unwilling to cooperate, or conveniently suffer from
memory failure. Again, the lack of subpoena power, combined with
corruption and governance issues, expose Latin American states to a class
of claims that can be very difficult to defend.
209. In many legal systems including those in Latin America, interested parties are not even
competent to testify, and cases are decided largely on the basis of documentary evidence.
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(d) Economic and Developmental
Besides relative experience and legal background, the financial strain
of the litigation can make it difficult to compete with certain claimant
investors, some of whom include the world's largest transnational
corporations. The budget of the legal departments of especially smaller
Latin American countries will not match-up with that of the well-heeled
investor intent to vigorously pursue what it sees as a good claim. Consider
some recent cases: $57 billion by Harken Energy Corp. against Costa Rica
in respect to offshore oil concession rights; 2 10 a $25 million claim (with
much more threatened) by the Bechtel Corp. against Bolivia for a
cancelled water concession; 21 ' a $180 million claim by Occidental
Petroleum against Ecuador in respect to a tax dispute in oil service
contracts;
and a $600 million claim by Azurix Corp (Enron) against
Argentina, for yet another abandoned water concession. 213
Clearly, with such huge dollar amounts at stake, claimants in these
cases will not hesitate to spend millions in putting together their best
possible case. Besides the prospect of an unfavorable award, respondents
will have to cover their own legal costs; that of experts and other
disbursements associated with defending the case; and the cost of the
arbitration (e.g., arbitrator fees and expenses)21 - all with no guarantee
of reimbursement even if they prevail. While arbitral rules have a notional
"loser pays" system, the tribunal has the discretion to not impose such
costs.
C. Ready Improvements on the PresentModel
Any forthcoming comprehensive exposition on how states can rework
investor-state arbitration will be welcomed - especially one that does not
entirely reject the very concept of the remedy. Any discussion of reform,
however, must recognize that existing BITs are here to stay, with little
likelihood of amendment or abrogation. 2" Prospectively, some states have
210. See National Law Journal: Business Subsection, available at http://www.nij.com/
business/032403bizlede.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). The writer has been unable to determine
before what arbitral body or under what arbitral regime the claim has been filed.
211. Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bol. (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3).
212. Repsol YPF Ecuador S.A. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador)
(ICSID Case No. ARB/01/10).
213. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12).
214. As noted earlier, arbitrator fees and expenses alone often exceed one million dollars.
215. See Pilch, supra note 32 (comments of Jose E. Alvarez) (discussing the impracticability
of a state party repudiating a BIT).
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recognized the need to improve on the texts and have tweaked the
provisions in their new treaties to address some of the deficiencies - the
most recent and notable example being the investment chapter (Chapter
Ten) of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (USCFTA). 216 States
negotiating new agreements, or looking to improve on existing
arrangements, would be well advised to carefully consider all the
implications of an investor protection treaty, and may wish to incorporate

some of the following elements.
1. Permanent Roster of Arbitrators
Under most investment treaties each disputant is entitled to select one
arbitrator on its own, and then the presiding member is chosen by
agreement, or by an appointing authority. 217 Two problems arise from this
approach: first, the impression of each disputant that party-selected
arbitrators are partial, and second, a lack of assurance in advance that the
president (and perhaps deciding vote) is an appropriate choice. Investment
treaties can avoid this by having the state parties select at the outset of
ratification a roster of panelists who are third party nationals. These
persons could be selected for service on specific claims at random to either
preside panels, serve as sole panelists, or even make up an entire threeperson tribunal. Having the state parties choose a respected group ofjurists
in advance who could serve on multiple occasions, for a fixed period of
time, would also help to add stability and consistency to a particular
treaty's jurisprudence. Under such a semi-permanent arrangement, a better
compensation system could be reached that avoided the perverse financial
incentives described earlier.
2. Clarifying the Scope of the Substantive
Investor-Protection Provisions
Here the USCFTA offers a good example of how state parties can rein
in future panels by more clearly and fully delimiting the definitions of an
investment treaty's key disciplines under the minimum standard of
treatment (e.g., fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security) and expropriation. The provisions under its investment chapter
include expounded explanations of what the concepts mean and do not
mean, complete with Annexes setting out the parties' "shared
216. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter USCFTA], available at http://www.ustr.
gov/new/fta/Chile/final/index.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
217. See infra Part II.D.
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understanding" of their meaning. 2 ' This approach goes a long way to
staving off the prospect of runaway tribunals intent on broadly interpreting
treaties in a manner well beyond that intended by the state parties.
3. Fact-Finding Procedures and Evidence
Transnational dispute resolution will always be an amalgam of
influences, practices, and procedures from the world's major legal
systems. As discussed in the discussion of procedural shortcomings, there
is no easy way to establish a fixed set of procedures (including evidentiary
standards) that all state parties could live with. Likewise, outside the ambit
of national arbitration law, it is doubtful that a tribunal could ever be
invested with subpoena-like powers sufficient to compel witness
attendance or discovery. That being said, there is one simple but effective
fact-finding feature that is already in use in WTO practice, and also
provided for under the new USCFTA investment chapter219 - namely,

disputants are entitled in advance to the tribunal's proposed award on
liability in order to submit written comments thereon for the tribunal's
consideration. While the practice does not directly relate to the rules for
gathering and presenting evidence, it will allow litigating parties to
adjudge how the panel has assessed the facts and evidence, and reargue
those matters they feel have been omitted or misjudged. The treaty could
further provide for an opportunity for disputants to submit additional
evidence where the interests of justice so warranted - including on a
showing that a material point of fact had been misconstrued.
4. Review Mechanism -

Appellate Body

Both existing and future parties to investment treaties can also look to
the USCFTA on a considerably more ambitious and dramatic
improvement on the present model: the establishment of some form of
omnibus appellate body to review awards from all investment treaties. The
creation of such a remedy would affectively amend existing BITs, and
would require a new treaty and perhaps a protocol to the ICSID
Convention. While ambitious, it is certainly feasible (especially and most
likely under the aegis of the WTO), and, as stated, has been specifically
contemplated under the USCFTA.2 20 While the number of treaties such a
218.
(meaning
219.
220.

USCFTA, supra note 216, art. 10.4 ("minimum standard of treatment"); id. Annex 10-A
of "customary international law"); id. annex 10-D ("expropriation").
Id. art. 10.19(9).
Id. art. 10.19(10).
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body would have to consider is large, the commonality of their substantive
provisions makes such a task manageable and desirable."'

VII. CONCLUSION -

INVESTMENT TREATIES AND THE GLOBAL
LEGAL ORDER

Investment treaties never fail to generate vigorous debate and discord
over whether the substantive norms they establish are good policy that
ultimately will encourage FDI and development in the third world, or,
conversely, that they amount to economic imperialism tying the hands of
developing nations. While that debate may rage on for those countries yet
to sign on to the BIT parade, much of the rest of the world - including
most of Latin America - has gone beyond that polemic and must now
deal with the prospect of having to defend a steady stream of investor
disputes under the authority of an evolving body of international law
which they cannot unilaterally control. Only time will tell if the ad hoc,
arbitral adjudicative model is up to the task. Thus far - at what is now a
relatively early stage - the strains are already showing.
Either way, these nations and others involved in investment dispute
resolution must begin to think beyond the substance of the language of the
protection disciplines, and turn their attention to matters of process. Like
any litigants, governments will react negatively to losing cases if they feel
the process is unsound and unfair.22 2 They well may reconsider the BIT
If a separate multilateral agreement enters into force as between the Parties that
establishes an appellate body for the purposes of reviewing awards rendered by
tribunals constituted pursuant to international trade or investment agreements to
hear investment disputes, the Parties shall strive to reach an agreement that would
have such appellate body review awards under Article 10.25 in arbitrations
commenced after the appellate body's establishment.
Id. The agreement also specifically contemplates the notion of an "appellate body or similar
mechanism to review awards" on a bilateral basis. Id. annex 10-H.
221. Merely granting national courts greater leeway (e.g. to set aside for errors of law or fact)
in reviewing arbitral decisions would hardly benefit the overall operation of investment treaties
(although at least it would spare particular litigants saddled with flawed awards). The prospect of
a balkanized review structure with national courts from all BIT-ratifying nations actively reviewing
arbitral awards under vastly diverse legal systems and practices is patently unsatisfactory. It would
strike at the heart of the very rationale of investor-state arbitration - the resolution of disputes in
a neutral, specialized forum.
222. Losing itself - something many states already have experienced - comes at its own
price. See Guzman, supra note 7, at 304.
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dalliance if dissatisfied with the financial and time burdens,22 3 the overall
nature of the proceedings, and a sense that their treaties having been
hijacked by private lawyers seeking to create a cottage industry for
themselves. The options consistent with the rule of law for investment-host
nations like those in Latin America are few. Unilateral withdrawal and
renegotiation are not likely to be viable options, at least in the short to

midterm. Instead, dissatisfaction with the remedy may cause governments
to react by simply not complying with awards, and vigorously fending off
execution efforts. Such an act of resistance would be a shot over the bow
of the international legal order - one that is already being seriously tested
in other contexts.

Being identified as having violated international law is costly for a state because
it leads to a loss of reputation in the eyes of both its counterparty and other states,
and because it might give the offended state the right to impose sanctions of some
kind. A loss of reputation harms a state because it makes it more difficult to enter
into future agreements.
Id.; Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments:
International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215, 237-38 (1996) ("Loss

of face in arbitration, explicit and visible waivers of sovereignty, and other data which can be
interpreted as bullying of the government by a foreign company usually have a high political price
for the government.").
223. See Pilch, supra note 32, at 553 (comments of Jose E. Alvarez) ("What is worse is that
it is not clear that the arbitral remedy of the BIT will survive any such onslaught. . . . BIT
signatories may be just as tempted as the United States to evade these treaties, to the detriment of
the rule of law generally").
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